A HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE

BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL

NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

OTTO HARRASSOWITZ · WIESBADEN

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For

Karabi

Bimal Krishna Matilal

NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

Chapter I

VAIŚEṢIKA

1. *The Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras*

The Vaiśeṣika system, which deals with the analysis of nature, takes its name from *viśeṣa* "particularity". Starting from the principle that the particulars of the world, especially the atoms and the souls, are eternal and the objects which we experience and which are made up of parts are non-eternal it develops an atomic theory in connexion with the substances of earth, water, light, and air (space). Although this system is earlier than the Nyāya, which discusses the problem of knowledge and analyzes the ways in which knowledge is acquired, it has assumed the main logical principles which were developed in the other system. The Nyāya derives its name from *nyāya*, the rules of logical thinking, the means of determining the right meaning or the right thing. Buddhists as well as Jainas had a share in the development of these systems.

Regarding the early history of both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, we know very little. But unlike the Sāṁkhya School, the earliest systematic presentation of Nyāya philosophy as well as Vaiśeṣika philosophy starts with the Sūtra texts. The Nyāya-sūtras are ascribed to Akṣapāda Gotama, while the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras are ascribed to Kaṇāda or Ulūka. The extant Sūtra texts of both schools, however, underwent various stages of development, modification and addition before their final compilation. Both works are largely unintelligible without a commentary. In all probability they were mnemonics summing up in definite form the doctrines that had long been discussed in these schools of philosophy. As such they formed so to say the text books for a full exposition given in oral instruction. The existing text of the Nyāya-sūtras is more systematically arranged than that of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras. The style, structure and content of the former betray almost an unmistakable mark of its later origin. Besides, there is evidence to show the earlier origin of the Vaiśeṣika School, viz., its relation with the Jaina School and the Mīmāṁsā School, reference to some

Vaiśeṣika ideas in the Vedānta-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, etc. Hence, I shall first of all deal with the Vaiśeṣika School, and then, with the Nyāya School. Later on, I shall discuss the Navya-nyāya School in which the two schools gradually merged into one.

Kaṇāda is regarded as the founder of the Vaiśeṣika School. He is also said to be the author of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras. But very little is known about the historicity of Kaṇāda. We know that his family name was Kāśyapa. Thus, both Praśastapāda and Uddyotakara refer to him as Kāśyapa.[1] An anecdote tells that he took the form of an owl to please Lord Śiva and hence he had the nickname Ulūka. Or, it is said, the name Kaṇāda, literally "Eater of grains" could also denote the owl. What is interesting is the close relation between many Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors with Śaivism. In the Jaina tradition, Kaṇāda is described as Ṣaḍ-ulūka, which is explained as "one who propounded the doctrine of six categories."[2] Accordingly, Mādhava in his Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha described the Vaiśeṣika system as Aulūkya philosophy.[3]

The Sūtra text presents us with many problems. Until 1950, scholars used to study only one version of the Sūtra text, the one accepted and commented upon by Śaṅkaramiśra who lived in the fifteenth century. But Śaṅkaramiśra himself was not very confident of the authenticity of the Sūtra text used by him, and hence regretted the lack of a connected history of the commentarial tradition on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.[4] Scholars before the 1950's had detected many irregularities in the available Sūtra text and were bewildered by them. But thanks to the efforts of A. L. Thakur and Muni Jambuvijayaji, we now have two earlier versions of this text. And thus, by comparing the three available versions of the Sūtra text, we are in a position to solve many old puzzles.

The date of composition of the sūtras ranges probably between 200 B.C. and the beginning of the Christian Era, although it is possible that some Vaiśeṣika doctrines were formulated much earlier. The Vaiśeṣika-sūtras do not presuppose any knowledge of the Nyāya School. Thus, one can conclude, in the absence of any strong evidence to the contrary, that the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra text precedes the Nyāya School. The great improvement in the order of the Nyāya-sūtras has rightly been regarded as another indicium of a later date for their redaction. There is no doubt, however, that the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras presuppose certain ideas of the Sāṁkhya and the Mīmāṁsā Schools. For example, the Vaiśeṣika theory of causation was a critique of the Sāṁkhya theory of causation which posited the pre-existence of the effect in the cause. This, in its turn, reflects the earlier dispute, found in the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads,[5] between the ("Being" *sat*)-Cosmology and "Non-being" (*asat*)-Cosmology. Besides, the

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[1] See Praśastapāda, p. 193.
[2] See Jinabhadra, Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, p. 1002.
[3] See Mādhava, p. 210.
[4] See Śaṅkaramiśra, Introductory verse of the Upaskāra.
[5] See, for example, the Nāsadīyasūkta of Ṛg-veda, Maṇḍala X, 129.

'Inference' theory of the Vaiśeṣikas seems to be also a criticism of the Sāṁkhya theory of 'Inference.'

But, in the existing state of our knowledge, it is difficult to decide whether the final compilation of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras took place after the compilation of the Ṣaṣṭi-tantra, the lost Sāṁkhya work of Vṛṣagaṇa. Mrs. Nancy Schuster[6] has argued, following the suggestion of E. Frauwallner, that a section of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, dealing with inference, was written as a criticism of Vṛṣagaṇa's theory of inference. But I am hesitant to accept this chronology, for the alleged Vaiśeṣika criticism of the Ṣaṣṭi-tantra view of inference could very well be explained as a mere critique of the Sāṁkhya theory of inference in general. And one may add, Vṛṣagaṇa, being confronted with the Vaiśeṣika critique, formulated more clearly the principle of Sāṁkhya epistemology as well as its view of inference. This is, at least, a plausible hypothesis not contradicted by the available evidence.[7]

Citation as well as refutation of Vaiśeṣika doctrines can be found in the philosophical literature of the first century A.D. Thus, in the Mahāvibhāṣā, or the Jñānaprasthāna, composed by Vasumitra under the patronage of King Kaniṣka (ca. 78—102 A.D.), we find the reference to the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra on action, i.e., fivefold classification of *karma*.[8] Caraka, who is also traditionally associated with the reign of Kaniṣka, seems to have based his medical theory on Vaiśeṣika physics. Even Aśvaghoṣa, if it was at all probable that he was the author of the Sūtrālaṁkāra, translated by Kumārajīva in 405 A.D., referred to the Vaiśeṣika School as well as to its original founder, Ulūka.[9]

The Vaiśeṣika-sūtras begin by proposing to explain *dharma*. The meaning of this term is highly debatable, and the second sūtra, which attempts to define *dharma*, does not help us very much; 1.1.2:

> "Dharma is that which brings about material progress and the supreme good."

Another sūtra adds that the authority attaching to the Vedas (or 'Tradition') is due to its being an expression of that *[dharma]*. The Vaiśeṣika definition of *dharma* may be contrasted with the Mīmāṁsā definition:

> "Dharma is the 'object' or 'good' marked by the Vedic injunctions."

Probably the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra re-defines *dharma* in order to make it an independent concept. Thus, the Vedas (Scriptures) become Vedas, because they speak of *dharma*, and it is not that the *dharma* becomes *dharma* simply because it is enjoined by the Vedas. The point just made seems to be corroborated by the entire history of the Vaiśeṣika School, where only two independent means of knowledge are accepted [perception and inference], and the scriptural authority is always made dependent upon inference.

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[6] See NANCY SCHUSTER, "Inference in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras," p. 324—352.
[7] See H. UI, p. 38—39.
[8] See H. UI, p. 38—39.
[9] See H. UI, p. 40—41.

(There is another interpretation of the occurrence of the term *dharma*, and reference to the Veda according to which a 'profane', scientific *sūtra* is superficially characterized as 'an orthodox' manual).

It is very significant that sūtra 1.1.4 in the Śaṅkaramiśra version is not found in any earlier version. Candrānanda thus completely ignores this sūtra. This sūtra states:

> "The 'supreme good' is achieved through the knowledge of reality resulting from a special merit arrived at through the inductive method of agreement and difference of properties of the six categories, namely, substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence."

This is in all probability a later interpolation in the Sūtra text. However, it represents the correct Vaiśeṣika doctrine. It is likely that someone after Praśastapāda compiled this sūtra in order to fill a supposed lacuna in the Sūtra text.

It will be useful to give a synopsis of the ten chapters of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.

Chapter 1, Section 1

The first three categories, substance, quality and action, are defined, and their causal aspects, their agreement and difference, are pointed out.

Section 2

The notion of universal and its hierarchical order are explained. The term *viśeṣa* [from which the word *vaiśeṣika* might have been derived] is originally used to denote a lower genus or universal. But Sūtra 1.2.6 [which could have been a later development] distinguishes the above sense of *viśeṣa* from another sense, according to which it means particularity or ultimate differentia of eternal substances. This latter sense dominated the later philosophy of this system.

Chapter 2, Section 1

The first five 'physical' substances, earth, air, water, fire and space, are defined by assigning physical qualities to each one of them. Some difficulty is noticed in establishing the air as a substance, for it is not "visible." But the sense experience of touch [when air blows] establishes the external touch as a quality, and air is inferred as the bearer of this quality. Similarly physical space is inferred first as a substance that makes it possible for bodies to move uninterruptedly (Sūtra 1.2.20). This was apparently an older view. Sūtras 2.1.24–28 establish physical space as the bearer of the physical quality, sound.

Section 2

Time and space [mathematical] are established as two different substances. Time is inferred on the basis of the empirically observed temporal predicates such as, 'earlier,' 'later,' 'simultaneous,' and 'sooner.' Space is inferred on the basis of spatial notions such as 'far' and 'near.' An important controversy about the nature of sound, about its being eternal or non-eternal, is introduced at the end. The Mīmāṁsā view that sound is eternal is refuted. The order of sūtras in this section is very confusing, for the Vaiśeṣika conclusion is not given at the end. This might indicate that the earlier and later sūtras were compiled here in an unsystematic manner.

Chapter 3, Section 1

A discussion of the Vaiśeṣika principle of inference is added as a prelude to the inference of the soul or self as the basis of cognitive states.

Section 2

Mind as a distinct internal organ is distinguished from other external sense organs. The existence of mind is inferred on the basis of non-simultaneity of cognitive states. Self is also inferred as the bearer of mental states as well as life-activities. This is followed by a number of sūtras [probably representing an earlier stratum] where various doubts are raised about the validity of the inference of self and about the possible identification of body and self. The self is finally established as the reference of the expression "I". The plurality of souls is also established in this context, and the idea of one world-soul is refuted.

Chapter 4, Section 1

An ambiguous reference is made to the notion of atoms, the eternal constituents of the four material substances. All visible material products are made of the invisible atoms.

Section 2

A physical body consists primarily of earth, the solid substance, and hence it is designated as earth.

Chapter 5, Section 1

The notion of action/motion is elucidated here. Human action is impelled by effort and attention. Man moves his hand and the hand moves the pestle. But a pestle may also move due to impact or thrust, or due to its weight. A straw moves in the air due to wind. And a body falls down when it is without any support or without the motion-inertia *(saṁskāra)* due to its quality 'weight'.

Section 2

Further explanation of various physical motions is given. Certain seemingly odd movements [a magnet pulling a needle or upward motion of heat] are

explained by referring to the notion of *adṛṣṭa* ['unseen' merit and demerit of those who make use of such motion]. In this context, three separate concepts are also explained: *yoga*, *mokṣa* and the nature of darkness. *Yoga* is defined as the lack of pleasure and pain when the mind is in a state of complete inaction within the self. *Mokṣa* [final emancipation] is defined as the self's lack of connection with a body and non-arising of a new body. Darkness is not a substance. It is merely the absence of light.

Chapter 6, Sections 1–2

This chapter discusses what kind of merit and demerit could be derived from the performance of various moral and scriptural actions.

Chapter 7, Section 1

The discussion of physical qualities is reopened, and it is explained how certain qualities such as colour and taste change under the application of heat, etc. In the discussion of measurement, the notions of atomicity and ubiquity are developed.

Section 2

Qualities such as number (countability) and separateness are dealt with. The relation of conjunction and disjunction is explained as two opposite qualities of substance. It is also shown how these qualities are generated and destroyed by the movement of bodies. In this connection, the relation between word and meaning is discussed and it is argued that such a relation is established through convention and usage *(samaya)*. At the end, the most important relation in the Vaiśeṣika system, i.e., inherence, is dealt with.

Chapter 8

The quality called cognition [act of consciousness] is explained. It is asserted that cognition [perception] of the substance is directly caused by the substance itself. One enigmatic sūtra states that the word *artha* [= object] is applicable only to substance, quality and action.

Chapter 9

Some preliminary observations are made about the theory of *asatkārya* [an effect is non-existent before it is produced by its causes]. In the rest of Chapter 9 and in Chapter 10, we have an interesting discussion about the process of inference. There is ambivalence in the sūtras regarding the correct process of inference. Primarily the Vaiśeṣika prefers *a priori* inference to an empirical inference based on observations. Thus, the Vaiśeṣika substances such as air, sky, space, time, self and mind are inferred on the basis of *a priori* principle. This inference can be described as follows: *p* is a quality and a quality by definition should reside in a substance. Thus *p* resides in a substance, and since this substance is not identifiable with any of the known substances, such as, *a*,

b, or *c*, by logic of elimination we infer the existence of a separate substance. This inference makes use of the *a priori* principle that a quality resides in a substance.

But the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras also refer to the principle of empirical inference. The model for inferential relation in the Vaiśeṣika is cause-and-effect or, any other relation derived from cause-and-effect. Thus, to the extent the causal relation is observable, the Vaiśeṣika inference may be said to be observational (Chapter 10, Sūtra 18). Even the so-called *a priori* inference is brought under the rubric of cause-and-effect relation, for, according to the Vaiśeṣika, a substance is only the material [inherent] cause of its quality and action. Hence one can infer the cause, i.e., the substance, from the effect, i.e., a quality. One can hazard a guess here that the 'substance-quality' inference represents the earlier stratum and the observational inference represents the later stratum in the history of development of the theory of inference in the Vaiśeṣika.

A similar conjecture is possible with regard to the list of qualities. Sūtra I.1.5 furnishes a list of seventeen qualities. But in fact, seven other qualities such as weight and fluidity are mentioned in later chapters. This also represents the development of the history of the Vaiśeṣika physics.

2. *The 'Dark Period'*

That there are different strata of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras is also supported by some traditional anecdotes. Vādīndra (ca. fourteenth century A.D.) says in his Kaṇāda-rahasya that an old Vaiśeṣika-sūtra text was originally composed by Lord Śiva and the present sūtra text was written by Kaṇāda when Lord Śiva, taking the form of an owl, instructed Kaṇāda. (Is this a reference to the non-Vedic origin of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras? For Śiva is generally held to be a non-Vedic god.)

According to the Chinese Buddhist tradition there were about eighteen different schools of Vaiśeṣika and Sāṁkhya in ancient India.[10] But this was, perhaps, an overstatement. It must be borne in mind that prior to the final compilation of the Sūtras, there must have evolved different Vaiśeṣika doctrines at different times for over several centuries. The first compilation, which might have taken place in the first century B.C., included at least a partial systematization of some Vaiśeṣika doctrines.

For several centuries after the first compilations of the Sūtras, there must have been a lot of activities in the field of Vaiśeṣika literature. Unfortunately we have lost almost all the Vaiśeṣika texts of this period. A systematic history starts with Praśastapāda (5th—6th century A.D.). The period between the Sūtra text and Praśastapāda is usually regarded by scholars as the 'Dark

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[10] See H. Ui, p. 8—9.

Period' in the history of Vaiśeṣika literature. One can however reconstruct this period on the basis of numerous citations and references found in the philosophical texts of other schools.

In the Jaina tradition, Ṣaḍ-ulūka Rohagupta (ca. 18 A.D) incorporated six Vaiśeṣika categories into Jainism. Evidently, Rohagupta was closely associated with the system of Ulūka. He also gives a list of seventeen qualities which was exactly similar to the list in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 1.1.5.[11]

Rohagupta furnishes us also with two different interpretations of *sāmānya* [generality]. His second interpretation agrees roughly with that of Praśastapāda. And Rohagupta's definition of inherence *(samavāya)* has been accepted *et verbatim* by Praśastapāda. One can contrast this definition with that of sūtra 7.2.29 where the inherence-relation is clearly derived from the notion of the causal substratum.

The Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa criticized not only the early Sāṁkhya views but also the Vaiśeṣika doctrines. In the Buddhist tradition, as H. Ui has shown, the Vaiśeṣika views were very often referred to and refuted. The Ratnāvalī, which is probably a work of Nāgārjuna (ca. 150 A.D.), refers to the Vaiśeṣika School as one of the several *nāstikas* (non-believers).[12] Āryadeva, a pupil of Nāgārjuna, criticized the Vaiśeṣika notion of time, space, sky and self.[13] Ui pointed out that several Vaiśeṣika-sūtras describing the notion of time and space were referred to in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra.[14] Harivarman (ca. 250 A.D.) in his Satya-siddhi clearly refers to the six categories of Ulūka and the sixteen topics of Nyāya.[15] In the Upāya-hṛdaya, or Prayogasāra, which survives in Chinese translation and must be placed in 400 A.D., we find the distinct reference to the theory of the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika.[16]

Apart from the above references, all of which belong to the so-called 'Dark Period,' we have access to two other important sources which throw considerable light on the history of the Vaiśeṣika literature. One is a Jaina work, the Nayacakra of Mallavādin along with Siṁhasūri's commentary, and the other is a Buddhist treatise, Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya along with Jinendrabuddhi's commentary. Thanks to the labour of Muni Srī Jambuvijayaji, we can now reconstruct the chronology of the Vaiśeṣika commentaries as follows:

Sūtra

Vākya — Kaṭandī

Bhāṣya

Praśastamati's Ṭīkā

[11] See Jinabhadra, Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, p. 981.

[12] Nāgārjuna, Ratnāvalī I, v. 60—61, p. 300.

[13] Āryadeva, Catuḥśataka, IX, v. 205—206.

[14] See H. Ui, p. 46—48.

[15] Ibid., p. 55.

[16] Upāyahṛdaya, p. 7.

From a study of Mallavādin and Siṁhasūri it seems clear that there was a brief commentary (probably, annotations) on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, called the Vākya. And on this Vākya someone must have written an elaborate commentary called Bhāṣya. Praśastamati wrote a Ṭīkā on this Bhāṣya. This is clear from such expositions of Mallavādin as:

> "vākyaṃ sabhāṣyaṃ praśasto 'nyathā vyācaṣṭe," i.e. "Praśasta explains the Vākya along with the Bhāṣya in a different manner."[17]

Siṁhasūri confirms the above construction by adding such expressions as

> "Now the author in order to support the view of the Sūtrakāra (the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra-kāra) is summarizing views of the authors of the Vākya, Bhāṣya and Ṭīkā."

Several citations from the Kaṭandī can also be located in Mallavādin. Siṁhasūri apparently distinguished Kaṭandī from the Ṭīkā of Praśastamati, for he mentioned them separately in the same sentence.[18] Murāri Miśra, an eight century dramatist, refers to the Kaṭandī of the Vaiśeṣika School and describes Rāvaṇa as an expert on the Kaṭandī (Anargha-Rāghava, Act. V). It is however highly improbable that Rāvaṇa, the mythical king of Laṅkā, should have written a Vaiśeṣika work like the Kaṭandī. But Murāri's reference might mean that someone bearing the name of Rāvaṇa wrote the Kaṭandī.

The Kaṭandī must have been an elaborate work on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, for even Udayana in his Kiraṇāvalī seems to have referred to it as an extensive Bhāṣya.[19] Padmanābhamiśra identifies this Bhāṣya as one composed by Rāvaṇa.[20] Even Govindānanda in his subcommentary on the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya refers to the Vaiśeṣika work, called Rāvaṇabhāṣya. In other places, we find references to the Ātreyabhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra (cf. Vādirāja, Vādideva, Rājaśekhara and Guṇaratna).[21] It is probable that Rāvaṇa and Ātreya were the same person and that the Kaṭandī acquired the fame of the Bhāṣya.

Dignāga referred to, and quoted from, different commentaries on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras in his Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Chapter I, Perception. Jinendrabuddhi identifies some of these commentaries. He mentions the name of Rāvaṇa and Śrāyaska, and distinguishes the Bhāṣya from the work of Rāvaṇa. It is also significant to note that none of the citations from the so-called Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya (found in Jinendrabuddhi) can be found in Praśastapāda's Padārthadharma-saṁgraha. Jinendrabuddhi mentions also a *vṛtti*—that is a brief paraphrastic explanation of a sūtra text—on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, which he might have followed. Candrānanda also quoted from a Vaiśeṣika-vṛtti under

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17 See Jambuvijayaji's note in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, p. 150—151.

18 Ibid., p. 157.

19 Udayana, Kiraṇāvalī, p. 4: "For the sūtras lack clarity of style, and the Bhāṣya on it is very extensive."

20 Padmanābhamiśra, Kiraṇāvalībhāskara, p. 12.

21 See A. L. Thakur, "Ātreya—The Bhāṣyakāra," in Indian Culture, 13, p. 185—188.

sūtra 9.18. Most of these references of the Vaiśeṣika-vṛtti are concerned with the theory of inference and logic. Thus, it is probable that the author of the Vṛtti, if he was different from Rāvaṇa, must have developed the Vaiśeṣika theory of logic, which was vehemently criticized by Dignāga. There is no reference to the notion of 'inference for others' *(parārthānumāna)* in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras. Besides, no definition of the concept of 'thesis' *(pratijñā)*, or the 'reason' *(hetu)*, or of the 'example' *(dṛṣṭānta)* can be found in that work. But Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi quoted the following definitions and ascribed them to the Vaiśeṣikas:[22]

1. A thesis is the statement of the provable *(sādhyābhidhānaṁ pratijñā)*.

2. The reason is the property of that which possesses the provable *(sādhya)* *(tadvaddharmasya hetuḥ)*.

3. A example is what is known to both sides *(ubhayaprasiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ)*.

These definitions might belong to one of the above mentioned lost works on Vaiśeṣika, most probably to the Vṛtti.

Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji thinks that this Vṛtti was identical with the Ṭīkā of Praśastamati. But this is debatable. Traditionally we hear about a Bhāradvājavṛtti on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras. But we cannot be definite whether this Bhāradvājavṛtti was identical with the Vṛtti referred to by Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi. In any case, it seems clear that the author of the Vṛtti was a logician. For Candrānanda quotes a long comment of this author on the concept of the inferential relation.[23]

3. *Praśastapāda, Candramati*

Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasaṁgraha undoubtedly marks the beginning of a new era in the Vaiśeṣika literature. Whether this Praśastapāda was identical with Praśastamati, the author of the Ṭīkā, or whether we are misled here by the similarity of the names, is a highly debatable point. Thakur, on the basis of two citations of Praśastamati found in Kamalaśīla's Tattvasaṁgrahapañjika (ninth century A.D.), has argued in favour of the identity of Praśastapāda and Praśastamati. He has also pointed out that the same person was referred to by many other names, such as Praśastakara, Praśastadeva, and Praśastakaradeva in later literature.[24] Thus, it is possible that Praśastapāda first wrote a subcommentary on the Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya, which followed the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras. But then, being apparently dissatisfied with the lack of order and clarity in the arrangement of topics in the Sūtras, he prepared an inde-

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[22] See MUNI ŚRĪ JAMBUVIJAYAJI, p. 197—208.

[23] Candrānanda, p. 69.

[24] THAKUR, Introduction, Gaekwad Or. Ser. 136, p. 14—15; see CHEMPARATHY, I. I. J. 12, p. 241 and in Ṛtam 1, p. 23 (Lucknow 1969).

pendent, concise, systematic and comprehensive treatise on the Vaiśeṣika School, the Padārthadharmasaṁgraha. This conjecture is also justified by Udayana's comment on the word *saṁgraha*:

> "The word *saṁgraha* is intended to mean clarity, conciseness and comprehensiveness of the present work. For the sūtra-text lacked clarity, the bhāṣya-text lacked conciseness and other *prakaraṇas* lacked comprehensiveness."[25]

In any case, Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasaṁgraha soon eclipsed the glory of all previous works on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras. It became later on the focal point of Vaiśeṣika literature. Many outstanding commentaries were written on it, as we shall see later.

There is, however, another enigmatic Vaiśeṣika text, Daśapadārthaśāstra, which survives in Chinese translation.[26] According to H. Ui, this text was translated by Yuan-chwang in 648 A.D. The name of the author of this text, as can be deciphered from Chinese, was either Candramati or Maticandra. E. Frauwallner prefers the former, while Ui prefers the latter. The text itself is very brief (perhaps, that was why it was chosen for translation), and gives the concise description of ten categories (instead of the usual six), which are: substance, quality, action, universality, particularity, inherence, potentiality, non-potentiality, commonness-cum-difference, non-existence or absence.

It is difficult to ascertain the date of this text. Ui placed it in the post-Praśastapāda period and believed that Candramati followed the Padārthadharmasaṁgraha.[27] Frauwallner, however, placed it in the pre-Praśastapāda period, i.e., the 'Dark Period'.[28] But almost all the citations that we have in the later literature referring to the 'Dark Period,' describe the Vaiśeṣika School as the system of six categories, not of ten categories. Thus, it seems odd that the Vaiśeṣika system of ten categories will go entirely unnoticed by the Jaina and Buddhist writers of this period. Two distinct points can be made in this connection.

First, the tenth category of Candramati, absence, was later accepted as the seventh category in the orthodox Vaiśeṣika system. But Praśastapāda was entirely silent about it. I have argued elsewhere that the acceptance of 'absence' as a category in the Vaiśeṣika School was partly due to the influence of the Nyāya School.[29] For in the Nyāya School absence was considered to be a real entity from the early period. Besides, Candramati gives the list of twenty-four qualities without any comment of his own. This list as well as the order given in the list became standard procedure for all later writers on Vaiśeṣika. But Praśastapāda, after giving the list of qualities, tried to explain why the

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[25] Udayana, Kiraṇāvalī, p. 4.

[26] Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, No. 1295. Also in the Taisho edition of Chinese Tripiṭaka 2138.

[27] H. Ui, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, London 1971, pp. 1—19.

[28] E. Frauwallner, 1955, p. 65—85.

[29] B. K. Matilal, The Navyanyāya Doctrine of Negation, p. 99—103.

Sūtra gave only a list of seventeen qualities, and how the other seven qualities should be added to the list. All this might indicate that Praśastapāda preceded Candramati.

Second, we have in Candramati's work two distinct categories; viz. universality and commonness-cum-difference. These two (*sattva* and *sāmānya-viśeṣa*) are included in one category called generality in Praśastapāda's version. The ambivalence regarding the distinction of *sattva* and *sāmānya-viśeṣa* is noticeable even in the sūtras. Rohagupta speaks about three types of universality: existence (pertaining to all six categories), existence as a generic character (pertaining to first three categories) and commonness-cum-difference like substanceness.[30] Praśastapāda was aware of the first problem, viz., the distinction between existence as such and existence as a generic character. But he refused to accept the former as an independent category. Thus, it may be that Praśastapāda's doctrine of universal was an improvement upon that of Candramati. This would mean, however, that Praśastapāda succeeded Candramati.

But Candramati accepted potentiality and non-potentiality as two distinct categories. Moreover, he posited a fivefold classification of absence. All this can hardly be regarded as a mark of primitivism. Later Vaiśeṣika authors accepted a fourfold classification of absence refuting the fivefold classification of Candramati. But Praśastapāda had nothing to say about absence or its classification. The category of potentiality was rejected by later Vaiśeṣika authors, although the Mīmāṁsā School accepted it as an independent category. Thus, Candramati's category system, on the whole, appears to be later and more complex than that of Praśastapāda. Besides, the account of perception and inference in Candramati is sketchy. This may indicate either that it was less developed than that of Praśastapāda, or that it was a summary of Praśastapāda's epistemology. Thus, I think the relative chronology of Praśastapāda and Candramati remains undecided by absence of any conclusive evidence. Since Praśastapāda was acquainted with Dignāga and is referred to by Uddyotakara he may have lived in the Vth century A.D.

The following is an example of Candramati's style:

> "What is cognition? That by which every object is understood is cognition.
> It is of two kinds: (1) perception and (2) inference.
> Perception is the sensory representation which is originated when sense-organs and so on come into contact with colour and so on, residing in appreciable substances.
> Inference is of two kinds: (1) inference from seeing a common property, and (2) inference from not seeing a common property.
> Inference from seeing a common property is reasoning which produces knowledge of an inferred object, the whole of which is not seen, by seeing the inferential mark, by recollecting the connection of the inferential mark with the inferred, and by contact of self with mind.
> Inference from not seeing a common property is reasoning which produces all kinds of knowledge of any invisible objects by seeing the cause of, the effect of,

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[30] See H. Ui, p. 35.

or a thing conjunct with, them, or by seeing a thing inherent in the same object, or a thing contradictory to them, by recollecting the connection with each (of the five objects), and by contact of self with mind.

What is pleasure ? Pleasure is the quality of one substance, self, and its nature is satisfaction.


What is pain ? Pain is the quality of one substance, self, and its nature is suffering." (H. Ui, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p. 97)

The Padārthadharmasaṁgraha gradually became the standard text of the Vaiśeṣika School, and the Sūtra text along with its commentaries and sub-commentaries was pushed into oblivion. It is not exactly a commentary because the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda are not cited *in extenso* or by their initial words and their order is not followed. Moreover, Praśastapāda has made distinct additions to Kaṇāda's system, among these the theory of twenty-four qualities in place of the seventeen recognized by Kaṇāda. Praśastapāda describes six categories along with their similarities and dissimilarities. He is also responsible for developing the Vaiśeṣika cosmology as well as for introducing the notion of a creator-god in the system (cf. Maheśvara).

After describing the four elemental substances, earth, water, air and fire, and their atomic constituents, Praśastapāda introduces a sub-chapter called "the process of creation and dissolution of the world." First, dissolution is characterized as the gradual disintegration of earth, water, fire and air into their constituent atoms. It is also asserted that the dissolution takes place because Lord Maheśvara wishes to let the beings rest for a while, and hence due to His will, the function of the Karma-mechanism *(adṛṣṭa)* remains suspended. Then again, at the will of the Lord, the process of creation starts when the karma-mechanism is set in motion. Lord Maheśvara is also said to be the one who connects the individual karma with the individual soul because he knows which karma belongs to whom.

This cosmology seems to be a novel innovation of the system, for initially the Vaiśeṣika system was not really theistic in character. The doctrine of atomic constituents of the four elemental substances was naturalistic in its approach to cosmology. Atoms combine to create bodies and separate from each other to dissolve them. And the guiding principle in the matter of such creation and dissolution of various entities was, in the early period, the karma-mechanism of all beings. Thus, God did not have any essential function to serve in this scheme of creation and dissolution. But Praśastapāda made God's will an important factor for the suspension and reactivation of the karma-mechanism. He also referred to the mythology of the 'cosmic egg' in the creation process. This mythology is found in the early Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. Thus, in Praśastapāda, the old mythological account is somehow readjusted to the philosopher's version of a cosmological theory.

Praśastapāda's account of cognition can be profitably compared and contrasted with Candramati's account of cognition. The following classification of cognition is found in Candramati:




The first type of inference is defined as "reasoning which produces knowledge of an inferred object, the whole of which is not seen, by seeing the inferential mark, by recollecting the connection of the inferential mark with the inferred, and by contact of self with mind."[31] This definition is very close to another definition quoted in Candrānanda's commentary and ascribed to the author of the Vṛtti. This type of inference is observational, and, unlike the other type, not based upon *a priori* relations such as inherence.

Praśastapāda also speaks about two types of inference: "observed" *(dṛṣṭa)* and "generally observed" *(sāmānyato dṛṣṭa)*. He illustrates the first type as knowing a cow from seeing the dewlap, of a person who has previously experienced that the dewlap exists only in a cow. This classification seems to be quite different from what Candramati had in mind.

In fact, the whole chapter on perception and inference in Praśastapāda shows marks of Dignāga's influence. But Dignāga has not been mentioned by name. Thus, it is probable that Praśastapāda was a junior contemporary of Dignāga, and that he assimilated entirely Dignāga's theory of inference into the Vaiśeṣika system.

Candramati, in another place, talks about a fourfold classification of both perception and inference:[32] doubt, decision, error and correct cognition. But Praśastapāda offers a different classification:



Praśastapāda argues that other means of knowledge such as verbal testimony should be included under inference. Thus, one can see here the influence of the Nyāya-sūtras 2.2.1.–2.2.7. The same author describes the 'inference for others' as identical with the five-membered statement of *nyāya* or argument. But his technical vocabulary in this regard is slightly different from that of the Nyāya-sūtras:

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[31] Ibid., p. 97.

[32] H. Ui, p. 108. Ui's English terminology is doubtful. By 'imperfect perception' he must have meant error, and by 'perfect perception' he must have meant *pramā*.

Praśastapāda	Nyāya-sūtras
(1) *pratijñā*	(1) *pratijñā*
(2) *apadeśa*	(2) *hetu*
(3) *nidarśana*	(3) *udāharaṇa*
(4) *anusaṁdhāna*	(4) *upanaya*
(5) *pratyāmnāya*	(5) *nigamana*

Praśastapāda mentions four major varieties of fallacious reason. They correspond with those in the list of Dignāga. It is interesting to note that the 'uniquely dubious' reason in Dignāga's list *(asādhāraṇa)* is called by Praśastapāda *anavadhārita* 'uncertain.' This might account for Praśastapāda's insistence on a distinction between doubt *(saṁśaya)* and uncertainty *(anavadhāraṇa)* (see the above list of four types of incorrect cognition). The Nyāya School, however, followed a different scheme of classification and listed five major kinds of fallacious reason.[33]

An idea of Praśastapāda's style may be gained from the following citation: (Praśastapāda describes the soul and its properties)

"[The existence of the soul as] an abode of qualities, is proved by inference, because of [the existence of] the qualities: pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition (= V.S. III, 2, 1) and these are not qualities of the body of or the sense-organs. Why?

1) *ahaṃkāreṇaikavākyatābhāvāt*
2) *pradeśavṛttitvāt*
3) *ayāvaddravya-bhāvitvāt*
4) *bāhyendriyāpratyakṣatvāc ca*
5) *tathāhaṃśabdenāpi pṛthivy-ādi-śabda-vyatirekāt*

i.e. 1) because [the qualities, mentioned above, pleasure &c.] can be put together in one sentence with the term 'I' [f.i. I feel happy, I feel unhappy &c.];
2) because they take place at one spot;
3) because they do not last as long as the substance [in which they inhere];
4) and because they are not perceived by the external organs of sense;
5) also because the word 'I' is [used] differently from the words 'earth' &c. [i.e. cannot be used in cases where we use the names earth &c.]

(Faddegon, Vaiśeṣika System, p. 258)

4. Commentaries on Praśastapāda

Tradition has it that there were four important 'ancient' commentaries on the Padārthadharmasaṁgraha:

a) the Vyomavatī of Vyomaśiva,
b) the Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara,
c) the Kiraṇāvalī of Udayana and
d) the Līlāvatī of Śrīvatsa.

[33] Akṣapāda, Nyāya-sūtra, 1.2.4—9.

But the last commentary, if it at all existed, is yet to be discovered. There is another important Vaiśeṣika text of the mediaeval period called Nyāya-Līlāvatī of Vallabha or Śrīvallabha. But it happens to be an independent treatise, not a commentary on Praśastapāda. It may be that tradition confused this work of Śrīvallabha with the supposed commentary of Śrīvatsa.

Tradition also has it that there are four 'modern' commentaries on Praśastapāda. They all belong to the Navya-nyāya period:

e) the Sūkti of Jagadīśa,
f) the Setu of Padmanābhamiśra,
g) the Bhāṣyanikarṣa of Mallinātha and
h) the Kaṇāda-rahasya of Śaṅkaramiśra.

a) Vyomaśiva

Of the three available commentaries, Vyomavatī was the oldest. Vyomaśiva was probably a Śaivaite teacher from the south. He was definitely the leader of a distinct group of Vaiśeṣikas. He must have commanded a great influence on contemporary and subsequent authors. Both Śrīdhara and Udayana respectfully referred to him as *ācārya*. The manuscript of Vyomavatī has unfortunately not been preserved in proper manner. Until 1916, no manuscript of this treatise was known to exist. Thanks to Pandit Gopināth Kavirāj, a transcript of the only manuscript of the Vyomavatī (discovered in a temple of southern India) was prepared in 1916. The first few pages were fragmentary in character. This transcript was later printed by Pandit Dhundhirāj Shāstri in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series (1930).

Very little is known about the date of Vyomaśiva. Dhundhirāj, in a footnote to his Sanskrit introduction, identifies him with Śivādvaita or Śivāditya on the basis of a very dubious document.[34] Dhundhirāj thinks that Śivāditya took the name of Vyomaśiva after being initiated by his guru. But there is little truth in this conjecture, for Śivāditya, as D. C. Bhattacharya has proved,[35] came after Udayana.

Vyomaśiva preceded both Śrīdhara and Udayana. But he apparently criticized some views of Bhāsarvajña. Thus he must be placed between Bhāsarvajña and Śrīdhara. According to D. C. Bhattacharya, Vyomaśiva was patronized by a Mālava king called Śrīharṣa, grandfather of the famous Bhojadeva. Thus his date should be in the range of 948—72 A.D. This date is also compatible with the fact that Vyomaśiva quoted such authors as Kumārila, Dharmakīrti, Prabhākara, all of whom belonged to the period between 600—800 A.D. There is also a suggestion in Vardhamāna's gloss on Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī, according to which Vyomaśiva could be placed before Vācaspatimiśra I.[36]

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[34] DHUNDHIRĀJ, Introduction, p. 6.
[35] D. C. BHATTACHARYA, 1958, p. 61—64.
[36] D. C. BHATTACHARYA, 1958, p. 61—64.

But this remains to be proven. Vyomaśiva was a pupil of a very great scholar, who must have written some text or texts to refute Buddhist views. He pays respect to his teacher many times in his text, but never mentions his name. For example, regarding the *trairūpya* doctrine of Dignāga, there are two views: one that reads an *eva* ("only") in all three statements to clarify the ambiguity in the predication, and the other that rejects such reading. Vyomaśiva supports the second view and comments that his teacher has elaborately discussed the point.[37]

Vyomaśiva, as a Vaiśeṣika author, held some so-called unorthodox views. For instance, he accepted, probably under the influence of Bhāsarvajña, the Naiyāyika, that verbal testimony is an independent means of knowledge.[38] Although Praśastapāda's text leaves no doubt about the fact that verbal testimony is to be included under inference, Vyomaśiva offers an ingenious interpretation to support his own view.[39] It may be noted in this connection that the Vaiśeṣikasūtra 9.19 *etena śābdaṁ vyākhyātam* ("In this manner, the verbal testimony is explained") is ambiguous enough to accommodate both views: inclusion of verbal testimony under inference and counting verbal testimony as an independent *pramāṇa*.

b) Śrīdhara

Śrīdhara is a well-known authority of the Vaiśeṣika School in the mediaeval period. Fortunately we know the date of composition of his Nyāyakandalī, for he himself records the date as 913 Śaka era = 991 A.D. He was born in the village of Bhūrisṛṣṭi in southern Rāḍha (West Bengal). Rājaśekhara, a Jaina scholar, commented upon his Nyāyakandalī in 1304 A.D. Śrīdhara was a popular author in western India, for many Jaina authors, among them Guṇaratna and Rājaśekhara, referred to him. He preceded Udayana. Although Udayana did not mention the name of Śrīdhara, he frequently cited and refuted Śrīdhara's views in his Kiraṇāvalī. This is proved by direct references in the sub-commentaries of the Kiraṇāvalī by Vādīndra and Vardhamāna. D. C. Bhattacharya has successfully refuted the view of Vindhyeswari Prasād Dvivedin that Śrīdhara and Udayana were only contemporaries who mutually criticized each other.[40]

Śrīdhara's style is elegant and clear, while Udayana's style is intricate and more abstruse. Śrīdhara became famous also for holding a peculiar view of the nature of darkness. The Mīmāṁsakas think that darkness is a separate substance. The Vaiśeṣika view prevailing in the sūtra period was that darkness is merely absence of light. Śrīdhara says that it is a special kind of colour which

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[37] Vyomaśiva, p. 565.

[38] Ibid., p. 577.

[39] Vyomaśiva uses the grammatical device of *atadguṇasaṁvijñāna bahuvrīhi*, p. 577.

[40] D. C. Bhattacharya, 1958, p. 10—11.

is imposed on all directions or quarters of the sky when there is an absence of light.[41]

I cite below a passage from Śrīdhara (where he tries to prove the existence of atoms) which will illustrate his simple, philosophic style, Nyāya-kandalī p. 43 l. 17:

> [Siddhāntin]: The atoms, [the existence of] which can be deduced from the [existence of the] aggregates, must be called existent.
>
> [Opponent]: The conjunction of the atom simultaneously with a sixfold [i.e. with six surrounding atoms] leads us to accept [the idea] that the atoms possess six parts (sides), and [consequently] excludes the existence of atoms.
>
> [Siddhāntin]: How is this simultaneous conjunction to be taken? It is either a simultaneous origination of the one atom with six other atoms? Or is it conjunction [which takes place] simultaneously? If it is a simultaneous origination—of a thing without parts [together with six other similar things]—in consequence of the simultaneity of the causes, what difficulty [could be raised]? But if it is a simultaneous conjunction, then neither is this inconceivable. For conjunction of objects does not concern their parts, for it also takes place with reference to (physical) space, which is without parts.
>
> [Opponent]: If I should answer: You are wrong; for, supposing that one portion [of the atom] were [identical with] the other, then conjunction [would remain] within the limits of one atom and we should get the unwished-for consequence that it [scil. the object or aggregate] could not be perceived; however it is an object in reality.
>
> [Siddhāntin]: The being subject to several conjunctions is possible, if simultaneous causes exist, just as well in reference to one undivisible atom, as in reference to a thing consisting of parts. Thus [you are] not [capable of] refuting [the existence of the atoms].
>
> (Faddegon)

Like the Vyomavatī, the Nyāyakandalī is a commentary on the entire text of Praśastapāda. Śrīdhara refutes the Mīmāṁsā doctrine of causal efficacy *(śakti)*. He explains that, in some cases, absence of an antidote is to be regarded as a causal condition and hence included in the 'totality of causal conditions' *(sāmagrī)*, while in other cases presence of a resuscitator *(uttejaka)* is to be included in the totality of causal conditions. Thus we have, according to Śrīdhara, empirical evidence for accepting the plurality of *sāmagrī*. This view was fully developed and systematized by Udayana in his Nyāyakusumāñjali.

c) Udayana

Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī is by far the best and the most erudite commentary on Praśastapāda. Unlike Vyomavatī and Nyāyakandalī, it covers only the first two chapters of Praśastapāda. In fact, it stops in the middle of the second chapter, the Guṇa Section.[42] This text has been frequently commented upon by well-known Navya-nyāya authors. The first part is known as the Dravya-Kiraṇāvalī, while the second part is called Guṇa-Kiraṇāvalī. The first part is

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[41] Śrīdhara, p. 24.

[42] See J. S. Jetly's edition of Kiraṇāvalī, G.O.S. 154, p. 258.

however more popular. Udayana, as D. C. Bhattacharya rightly observes, "had the privilege of occupying the threshold to ring out the old and usher the new age by his monumental works."[43]

In the Kiraṇāvalī Udayana more than once referred to his two earlier works, Ātmatattvaviveka and Nyāyakusumāñjali. He criticized severely the views of Bhāsarvajña in that work and established the traditional Vaiśeṣika views such as that action-motion is an independent category, not to be included under guṇa or quality. In the Nyāyakusumāñjali, which consists of seventy-two memorial stanzas, he vindicates the existence of God (Īśvara) from the Nyāya point of view against the non-theists.

The actual date of Udayana has been a matter of some dispute. In his short work, the Lakṣaṇāvalī, he apparently gives the date of its composition, viz., 906 Śaka era = 984 A.D. But D. C. Bhattacharya has argued that this date is recorded only in one manuscript of the Lakṣaṇāvalī and that it is contradicted by other available evidence of Udayana's date. Thus, it is better to reject this date. For, Udayana's date is to be ascertained with respect to the dates of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti on the one hand and Śrīharṣa on the other. According to the tradition, Śrīharṣa's father, Śrīhīra, was defeated and humiliated by Udayana, and thus Śrīharṣa wrote his monumental work (on Advaita) called Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya to refute Udayana's views. Udayana was probably a junior contemporary of Ratnakīrti. D. C. Bhattacharya[44] thus concludes that he must have flourished between 1025—1100 A.D. But I think that he might have been born twenty years earlier. An example of Udayana's method of proof may be cited here from the Kiraṇāvalī:

> "That which has origination independent of a body, has for (its) cause an intelligent being;
> because it has the nature of that which has a cause.
> That which has a cause has an intelligent being as a cause, like a chariot.
> And so is this (which has origination independent of a body).
> Hence (this, too), has an intelligent being as (its) cause."
> (Chemparathy, Ind. Rat. Theology, p. 87)

There has been a chain of commentaries and sub-commentaries on all major works of Udayana, and the Kiraṇāvalī is no exception. Vardhamāna, son of Gaṅgeśa, wrote his Prakāśa commentary on both parts of the Kiraṇāvalī, Dravya—"substance, entity" one of the categories distinguished—and Guṇa—"quality," another category. Padmanābhamiśra wrote his commentary, Kiraṇāvalībhāskara. Several sub-commentaries were written on Vardhamāna's commentary, viz., a) the Dravyaprakāśikā by Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura, b) the Guṇakiraṇāvalīdīdhiti of Raghunātha. Raghunātha probably wrote a sub-commentary also on the Dravya Section. But the manuscript of this work is difficult to find. Mathurānātha wrote a sub-sub-commentary on Raghunātha's Guṇakiraṇāvalīdīdhiti. Rudra Nyāyavācaspati, son of Vidyānivāsa, wrote

[43] D. C. BHATTACHARYA, 1958, p. 1.
[44] D. C. BHATTACHARYA, 1958, p. 51—54.

another sub-sub-commentary on the same commentary. All these authors, however, belonged to the Navya-nyāya period in the history of Indian philosophy. Thus all these commentaries are full of technical vocabularies of Navya-nyāya.

5. *Śrīvallabha and Vādi-vāgīśvara*

Several short and elementary treatises on Vaiśeṣika were written in the mediaeval period. Udayana contributed two such texts: Lakṣaṇamālā and Lakṣaṇāvalī. Sarvadeva wrote his Pramāṇamañjarī and Śivāditya his Saptapadārthī, a manual of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines incorporating the Nyāya theory of the *pramāṇas* (means of arriving at correct knowledge). Vādivāgīśvara wrote his Mānamanohara, which was slightly more elaborate than the others already mentioned. Vādivāgīśvara hailed from the south of India and probably belonged to the twelfth century A.D. He was probably a contemporary of Śrīvallabha. He was cited by Citsukha, the Vedāntin, as well as by Śaśadhara, a Navya-nyāya writer. The Mānamanohara is primarily a Vaiśeṣika work although the marks of Navya-nyāya style are unmistakable here. For a long time this text was not available, but fortunately Svāmī Yogīndrānanda published it in 1973. The text is divided into ten chapters in which all the seven Vaiśeṣika categories are discussed (Chapters 2–8). Chapter 1 establishes the concept of God, the 'whole' and the 'atoms' as philosophical categories. Chapter 9 contains a refutation of philosophic categories of other systems, e.g., potentiality and similarity. The last chapter in which the view of Bhāsarvajña is refuted, deals with the nature of *mokṣa* (freedom, final emancipation). Vādivāgīśvara starts each section with a technical inference to establish the required category such as God and atoms, and ends usually with a technical definition of the category concerned.

But by far the best Vaiśeṣika treatise in the mediaeval period was Śrīvallabha's Nyāyalīlāvatī. It is an independent work, and one of the most intricate and erudite texts of this period. It is probable that Jaina authors, for instance Guṇaratna and Rājaśekhara, confused this text with the supposed fourth commentary on Praśastapāda ascribed to Śrīvatsa. There was however one Śrīvatsa, who was the well-known teacher of Udayana. But Udayana never mentions that his teacher also wrote a commentary on Praśastapāda. Thus, in all probability, the Jaina authors were wrong.

Śrīvallabha named his text after his beloved wife, Līlāvatī, and in the second introductory verse he describes, as a skilful poet, the expertness of Lady Līlāvatī in love-making and in the science of reasoning (with the excellent use of pun). The author explicitly refers to the mutual borrowings of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika Schools. For example, absence, according to him, was accepted as a separate category in the Vaiśeṣika system under the influence of

Nyāya, whereas mind as the internal sense-organ *(indriya)* was taken over by the Nyāya School from the Vaiśeṣika.[45]

The Nyāyalīlāvatī consists of seventy-five sections *(prakaraṇas)*, divided into four chapters. The first chapter is the largest one comprising fifty-eight sections. It is called Padārthavibhāgaparicheda, and contains a detailed examination of all the Vaiśeṣika categories and sub-categories. The theory of knowledge, perception and inference, is covered in eighteen sections (Sections 30—47). This shows the gradual importance of the *pramāṇa* section in the new school, and it might have inspired Gaṅgeśa to write his Tattvacintāmaṇi which is devoted entirely to the discussion of *pramāṇas*. The last three chapters are short, but they indicate the author's originality. In the fourth chapter, called Prakriyā, Śrīvallabha tries to meet some of the fundamental objections to the Vaiśeṣika category system.

Like Udayana, Śrīvallabha was a powerful writer and a master of style. But his technical and argumentative discussion is interspersed with elegant poetic passages here and there. Sometimes his poetic sentences are reminiscent of the style of Bāṇa and Daṇḍin.[46]

Śrīvallabha refers to Udayana not as *ācārya* "teacher", but as Kiraṇāvalīkāra. This shows that he flourished soon after Udayana. Śrīharṣa never referred to Śrīvallabha, although he severely criticized Udayana. This might indicate that Śrīvallabha was a contemporary of Śrīharṣa (ca. 1125 A.D.). On the other hand, Śrīvallabha refers to Vyomaśiva as Vyomācārya and to Vācaspatimiśra I as Tātparyācārya.[47]

Śrīvallabha's work was the last important classic of the Vaiśeṣika School and hence attracted the best intellects of the Navya-nyāya School. Thus, we have a series of commentaries and sub-commentaries on this work. In this regard, it is comparable to Udanaya's Kiraṇāvalī. Vardhamāna wrote his Līlāvatīprakāśa on Līlāvatī, and Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura wrote a sub-commentary called Vivṛti. Pakṣadhara (Jayadeva) wrote another commentary under the title Līlāvatīviveka. Śaṅkaramiśra, the great polymath of Mithilā, wrote another commentary known as Līlāvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa.

6. Commentaries on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras (the Upaskāra etc.)

Śaṅkaramiśra was a prolific author of Mithilā. He was a poet as well as a dramatist. He also wrote on Smṛti. But above all, he was a Nyāyavaiśeṣika scholar. He belonged to the second half of the fifteenth century A.D. One of

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[45] Śrīvallabha, p. 356.

[46] For example, see his description of clarity of water in autumn on page 144. See Śrīvallabha, Nyāyalīlāvatī.

[47] Śrīvallabha, p. 834 and p. 358.

his manuscripts of the Khaṇḍana-ṭīkā, preserved in the Manuscript Library of Benares, bears the date August 1473 A.D., the scribe clearly indicating that the author was alive at that time.[48]

Besides the commentary on the Līlāvatī, Śaṅkara wrote several Vaiśeṣika works mentioned below.

His Kaṇādarahasya is a very useful Vaiśeṣika manual of moderate length. Śaṅkara followed Praśastapāda's method and divided the text into six chapters. It is significant to note that no separate chapter on 'Absence' is given here although the author belonged to the Navya-nyāya period. But nevertheless, the entire Vaiśeṣika category system was redescribed by Śaṅkara using Navya-nyāya technique and methodology.

The next important work of Śaṅkara is Upaskāra. He had the boldness to write an original commentary on the much-neglected and almost obscure text, the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras. He said in the beginning of the Upaskāra that his commentary would be as adventurous as the sporting in the void sky with only a string or a thread (*sūtra* referring also to sūtra-text). During his time, there was practically no commentarial tradition of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras available. Thus, although Śaṅkara should be credited for his heroic attempt to write a commentary on the Sūtras, his interpretation was wrong in most places. But until the 50's of this century, the Upaskāra was the only known commentary on the Sūtras available to the scholars. Śaṅkara apparently had a vṛtti before him and he cited from this vṛtti on several occasions. But we do not know anything as to the identity of this work. One thing however is certain. The whole tradition of Vākya-Bhāṣya-Kaṭandī was irrevocably lost. Śaṅkara wrote in Navya-nyāya style and gave brilliant summaries of several Navya-nyāya topics in his Upaskāra. Pañcānana Tarkaratna wrote a sub-commentary called Pariṣkāra on the Upaskāra in the early 30's of the twentieth century. Pandit Vīrarāghavācārya wrote another commentary on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras (called Rasāyana), likewise in this twentieth century. This commentary raised many exegetical and interpretative problems encountered in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.

Candrānanda's Vṛtti

Thanks to the labour of modern researchers, we now have before us at least two commentaries on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, written earlier than the Upaskāra. Perhaps, the earliest available commentary is the Vṛtti by Candrānanda. The manuscript was discovered by Muni Śrī Puṇyavijayaji, and carefully edited by Jambuvijayaji in the Gaekwad Or. Series, No. 136. Very little is known about Candrānanda's personal history. But this is the only commentary available that was written in the pre-Navya-nyāya period. Candrānanda's style is lucid and elegant. His commentary solves many puzzles relating to the interpretation of the Sūtras. Candrānanda's reading of the Sūtras was perhaps closer to the original. He might have belonged to the eighth or the ninth century A.D.

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[48] D. C. Bhattacharya, 1958, p. 140.

The only author he quotes by name is Uddyotakara. It is significant to note that he followed Praśastapāda in interpreting the Vaiśeṣika system as a theistic system. Thus, the word *tat* ('that') in the sūtra 1.1.3 which is repeated also as 10.21, is interpreted by Candrānanda as referring to Lord Maheśvara (Śiva).

Vyākhyā

Another commentary belonging to the twelfth or thirteenth century A.D. has now been discovered and edited by A. Thakur. Unfortunately the name of this commentary is not known to us. But Thakur conjectures that it may be from the pen of Vādīndra. He says, "A preliminary study of the available portions of the Kaṇādasūtra-nibandha of Vādīndra has convinced us that the present commentary is an abridged version of this Nibandha."[49] This commentary refers to two well-known Vaiśeṣika authors, Udayana and Vādivāgīśvara.

[49] Thakur, Vaiśeṣikadarśana, Dharbhanga 1957, p. 8.

Chapter II

THE EARLY NYĀYA SCHOOL

7. *Nyāya-Sūtras*

The final compilation of the Nyāya-sūtras must have taken place long after that of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras. The Nyāya-sūtras are, however, systematically arranged, and the meanings of individual sūtras are reasonably clear. Some Vaiśeṣika-sūtras are found repeated, with slight variation, in the text of the Nyāya-sūtras (e.g., sūtra 1.1.8). But like the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, the Nyāya-sūtras had also different strata that were compiled together in their final redaction.

The Nyāya system as a school of philosophy should be distinguished from its earliest phase which was mainly concerned with the study of reasoning and the art of philosophic debate. This proto-Nyāya was a kind of a *vāda-śāstra* a "scientific treatise on disputation." It might have originated in the disputations and debates among scholars and philosophers in ancient India. A *vāda-śāstra* is primarily composed of a list of some logical categories and some theoretical categories describing a debate-situation, its rules and regulations. Most of these categories were later incorporated in the Nyāya-sūtras, mainly in the chapters I and V.

Several Vāda-categories were probably the common property of almost all philosophical schools of ancient India. In the Pāli canons and the early epic literature some materialistic philosophers were described as specialists indulging in idle and futile logic. But this need not be taken as an indication that logic and Vāda-rules originated in the Lokāyata (or materialistic) school. G. Tucci has pointed out that "when the system had begun to assume a definite individuality and disputes among the various schools of thought increased, the practical importance of the Vāda-rules came to be recognized by various sects, so that we may logically assume that different Vāda-śāstras, a kind of *vade-mecum* for philosophical discussion always in vogue in India and well attested by Brahmanical as well as Buddhist sources, were in circulation quite independently among the various schools."[50]

There are several specimens of Vāda-śāstras which have come down to us for comparison: The Vāda system incorporated in the Nyāya-sūtras, the Vāda section in Caraka and the Vāda rules in the Upāyahṛdaya as well as in the works

[50] G. Tucci, Introduction, Pre-Dignāga text, p. XXI–XXV.

written by Maitreya and Asaṅga. There was another list of categories prevalent at this time. This is the list of Tantrayuktis, which partly coincides with the list of Vāda categories. This list is found in Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra as well as in Caraka.

It is probable that the system of Vāda categories became more refined and methodical in the hands of the followers of a realistic philosophy (such as the Vaiśeṣika). And from the Vāda rules they eventually developed a full-fledged philosophic system by adding the doctrine of the soul, of final release, as well as a doctrine of *pramāṇas* (means of knowledge). It is significant to note that the Nyāya doctrine of the soul was identical with the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of soul and substance. Thus some early writers, among them Āryadeva, mistakenly described some Nyāya-sūtras as belonging to the Vaiśeṣika school.

Kauṭilya used the term *ānvīkṣikī* for philosophy, which was recognized as one of the four distinct branches of study. The other three branches were the Vedic scriptures, commerce and polity. It is said in the Arthaśāstra that Manu regarded philosophy as part of the Vedic study.[51] Kauṭilya mentioned three varieties of philosophy: Sāṃkhya, Yoga,[52] and Lokāyata. The term Yoga does not mean here the Yoga school of Patañjali. It might have meant logic—the science of reasoning *(yukti)*. Vātsyāyana re-interpreted the term *ānvīkṣikī* as logical investigation or the science of reasoning, and identified it with the Nyāya-vidyā. He has observed that although Nyāya-vidyā includes the doctrine of the soul it should be distinguished from the pure metaphysics of soul or Being by virtue of its special study of reasoning and logic.[53] Even Kauṭilya was aware that in *ānvīkṣikī* one investigated the strength or weakness of a position or a thesis through reason and logic.[54]

Bhāsa in his Pratimānāṭaka refers to the Nyāya-śāstra of Medhātithi.[55] S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, on the basis of a Mahābhārata verse (cf. 12,258,42), identifies this Medhātithi with Medhātithi Gautama, and says that he was the husband of Ahalyā in the Rāmāyaṇa.[56] But it is difficult to say how much historical truth is there in such fanciful stories.

The Nyāya-sūtras—which are certainly the products, not of one man, but of a school of thought—are sometimes referred to as the sūtras of Gautama.[57] But the early commentators, e.g. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, clearly mentioned Akṣapāda as the author of the Nyāya-sūtras. Some people conjecture that the family name of Akṣapāda was Gautama or Gotama. But Vidyābhūṣaṇa thinks that Gotama and Akṣapāda were two different persons. For him, Gotama was the earlier author of the Nyāya school, who dealt with the Vāda

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[51] Kauṭilya, p. 2.
[52] According to some, *yoga* refers to the dual school of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.
[53] See Vātsyāyana, under Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.1.
[54] Kauṭilya, p. 3.
[55] Bhāsa, Pratimā, Act V.
[56] S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, p. 17—21.
[57] See the Vṛtti of Viśvanātha.

rules, logic and Pramāṇas, whereas Akṣapāda was the 'redactor' of Gotama's system, who also added the *prameya* doctrine, and the doctrine of soul and release.

It is difficult to determine when the final redaction of the Nyāya-sūtras actually took place. H. Jacobi[58] places their date between 200 A.D. and 450 A.D. on the ground that Nyāya-sūtras criticized the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. But Tucci has expressed his doubts about the validity of this evidence.[59] It is interesting to note the interrelation between the final phase of the Nyāya-sūtras and Nāgārjuna's writings. The Nyāya-sūtras appeared to have answered succinctly the Mādhyamika critique of the *pramāṇa* theory. But the Vigraha-vyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna seemed to have presupposed the Nyāya answers. Besides, in the Vaidalyaprakaraṇa of Nāgārjuna all the sixteen categories of the Nyāya-sūtras have been mentioned and criticized.[60] Thus we are led to believe that the final redactor of the Nyāya-sūtras and Nāgārjuna must have been contemporaries. If Nāgārjuna's date was 150 A.D., the final redaction of the Nyāya-sūtras must have taken place in the first two centuries of the Christian era.

Contents of the Nyāya-sūtras

It would be wrong to look upon the text of the Nyāya-sūtras as merely a Vāda-śāstra with some incidental discussion of *pramāṇa* (theory of knowledge) and *prameyas* (objects of knowledge, e.g., the soul). We should notice that the Nyāya-sūtras gave primacy to the *pramāṇas* and *prameyas* (the first two categories of the list of sixteen), and thus brought the epistemological theory in the forefront of philosophic discussion or debate. In this regard, the final version of the sūtra-text differs from other available Vāda-śāstras.

The first sūtra states that the final release ("the highest good") can be achieved through a proper understanding (cf. *tattvajñāna*) of the sixteen categories. The first two categories were *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. The last fourteen categories were only various concepts of the Vāda-śāstras.

Akṣapāda then defines the four means of knowledge *(pramāṇa)*: perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. All these definitions became most influential in the later development of the Nyāya school as well as in the development of Indian epistemology in general.

Final release is defined in the Nyāya-sūtras in terms of the complete absence of unhappiness *(duḥkha)*. It is thus reminiscent of the Buddhist concept of Nirvāṇa. In sūtra 1.1.2, Akṣapāda works out a scheme for attaining *mokṣa* or

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[58] H. Jacobi, "The date of the philosophical sūtras," J.A.O.S., 31, p. 1ff. According to others the Nyāya-sūtras fall in the period between Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga.

[59] G. Tucci, Introduction, p. XXIII—XXV.

[60] See Y. Kajiyama, "The Vaidalyaprakaraṇa of Nāgārjuna," Journal of the Faculty of Literature, Nagoya, Japan, VI—VII, p. 129—145.

final release through knowledge (cf. *tattvajñāna)*. Unhappiness is caused by the cycle of birth and rebirth, which is again caused by motivated action. Motivated action results from "defects" *(doṣa)*, which are the residual forces of past activities perpetrated under misconceptions (*avidyā* or *mithyājñāna*). Thus, misconception holds the crucial position in the causal chain (that produces unhappiness) which is supposed to be broken by our proper knowledge of reality. This scheme is also reminiscent of the Buddhist doctrine of twelve-membered dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda* 'Kausalnexus' or 'théorie de la production conditionnée').

There are five chapters. Chapter I formulates primarily the definition of each of the sixteen categories and their sub-categories. We have here the formulation of the five-membered proof-procedure called five *avayavas:*

1. *Pratijñā* (statement of the thesis) Vātsyāyana's example: "Sound is non-eternal."
2. Reason: "because it is a product."
3. Exemplification of the principle *(udāharaṇa)* "Whatever is a product is also seen to be non-eternal, such as a pot." (The contraposed example is also given).
4. Application of the principle: "sound is also a product in the same sense."
5. Conclusion or repetition of the thesis as conclusion: "Therefore, since sound is a product, it is non-eternal."

Five fallacious reasons are also mentioned in this chapter: 1) Deviating reason, 2) Contradictory reason, 3) Dubious reason, 4) Unestablished reason, and 5) Mistimed reason. All of these are supposed to invalidate the above proof-procedure.

Chapter II examines the definitions of four *pramāṇas* in detail. Chapter III (on psychology) examines the notion of self, body, sense-organs, objects, cognition, and mind, i.e. the first six entries in the list of twelve *prameyas*. Chapter IV examines the rest of the *prameyas*, action, motivation, rebirth, result, unhappiness, and final release.

An incidental examination of different metaphysical views is inserted after the examination of the 'rebirth' concept. This section is particularly interesting. It records as many as eight views of reality, all of which are criticized. Vātsyāyana referred to the upholders of these views as the "debaters" (cf. *prāvādukāḥ*). The 'emptiness' doctrine is referred to, and probably an answer to Nāgārjuna's critique of *svabhāva* ("own-nature") is given in sūtra 4.1.38. The problem of God is discussed, although no apparent solution was given.

The second half of Chapter IV examines the concept of proper knowledge of reality. Two incidental discussions are inserted here: a) examination of the concept of whole and part along with the notion of atoms, and b) examination of the view that external reality is a creation of the mind. The remaining part of Chapter IV treats of some *yoga* practices which are supposed to facilitate and strengthen our knowledge of reality *(tattvajñāna)*.

Chapter V, an addendum, deals with some debate-categories, such as twenty-four sub-varieties of 'futile rejoinders' *(jāti)* and twenty-two varieties of defeat-situation *(nigrahasthāna)*. It is also asserted in sūtra 4.2.50 that a study of these debate categories is useful for the protection of one's knowledge or proper understanding of reality.

8. *Vātsyāyana*

The Nyāya-(sūtra)-bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana is the first available commentary on the entire Nyāya-sūtras. Vātsyāyana was a family *(gotra)* name. His first name was Pakṣilasvāmin. His date was probably between 350 and 450 A.D. His logical theories were severely criticized by the great Buddhist logician Dignāga. Vātsyāyana himself might have referred to the Sāṃkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin.[61] According to the Jaina author Hemacandra Vātsyāyana was identical with Kauṭilya and he was a Dravidian *(Drāmila)*.[62] But there is no evidence to support the historicity of this claim.

Vātsyāyana's style is simple and archaic. He refers to the alternative interpretations apparently given by other Nyāya authors. This shows that there must have been other commentators on the Nyāya-sūtras before Vātsyāyana. But probably Vātsyāyana was the first to cover the entire text of the Nyāya-sūtras.

Vātsyāyana describes the moral principles of the Nyāya system under sūtra 1.2.2. He records ten kinds of sinful activities leading to the accumulation of demerit and thus perpetuating rebirth and unhappiness, and ten kinds of good activities leading to the accumulation of merit:

	Bad action	Good action
physical	1) killing	1) benevolence
	2) stealing	2) protecting life
	3) adultery	3) service to others
vocal	4) telling lies	4) truthfulness
	5) harsh words	5) pleasant words
	6) slander	6) beneficial advice
	7) mad rambling	7) study of the scriptures
mental	8) hate	8) kindness
	9) avarice	9) non-avarice
	10) lack of faith	10) faith

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[61] See E. FRAUWALLNER, 1958, p. 1—58.

[62] Hemacandra's Abhidhānacintāmaṇi, and also see J. S. JETLY, Introduction to Kiraṇāvalī, p. VI.

Vātsyāyana makes some significant observations on the methodology of a *śāstra* (a didactic and authoritative treatise on a branch of science or learning). His theory became more or less the standard method for writing a *śāstra* in the later period:

> "This *śāstra* has three operations: enumeration, definition, and examination. Enumeration is the naming of the categories. Definition is giving the property that delimits the essence of the enumerated category. Examination is ascertaining through *pramāṇas* whether or not the defined category is characterized by the definientia."[63]

An interesting feature of the Bhāṣya style is that the writer himself frames sometimes *sūtra*-like, brief, statements which he will elaborate afterwards. Both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara followed this style. For example, while commenting upon the definition of final release, Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.22, Vātsyāyana embarks upon an interesting discussion whether final emancipation is a state of blissful happiness. Apparently some Vedāntin held the above view. But Vātsyāyana re-asserts the Nyāya position that release is merely absence of unhappiness and rebirth. The whole discussion in Vātsyāyana is given here in the form of the *sūtra*-cum-commentary style.

In the *pramāṇa* section, Vātsyāyana notes that truth consists in knowing not only the existent as existent but also the non-existent as non-existent. Thus, *pramāṇa* reveals the existent as existing and also the non-existent as absent. However, the non-existence of x is known through a counter-factual judgment: "If x were present, it would have been revealed to us by a *pramāṇa*." This principle of Vātsyāyana probably led the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers to construe 'absence' *(abhāva)* as the seventh category over and above the six positive ones.

Vātsyāyana shows his close acquaintance with the Vaiśeṣika school in many places. Under the *prameya*-sūtra 1.1.9 he notes that the six Vaiśeṣika categories are also called *prameyas*. Vātsyāyana extensively quotes from the Vedic scriptures such as Ṛg-veda, Taittirīya Āraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣad, in order to justify the Nyāya conception of final release.

The definition of 'soul' in Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.10 follows essentially the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 3.2.4. Thus Vātsyāyana, instead of explaining the sūtra here, tries to refute the Buddhist view that 'soul' is to be identified with the ever-changing series of consciousness.

Vātsyāyana is not quite at home in explaining the logical sections of the Nyāya-sūtras. Undoubtedly he records the logical discussions of his time. But his exposition of logical theories lacks originality and innovation, and suffers from vagueness and ambiguity. For example, under sūtra 1.1.35 he mis-states the contrapositive version of the inferential relation. But in spite of all this, Vātsyāyana's text is one of the most important source-books on logic in ancient India. He has explained how Akṣapāda's logic was understood and interpreted

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[63] See Vātsyāyana, Introduction to sūtra 1.1.3.

by the Nyāya authors of his time. He also underlines the empirical character of the Nyāya inference, for he notes that inference must be preceded by two perceptual states, perception of the indicator or reason, and prior perception of the relation between the indicator and the indicated.

Under sūtra 1.1.32 Vātsāyayana refers to a view which requires ten (instead of the usual five) component members of a full-fledged proof-procedure. This was presumably a Sāṃkhya view, for it is also referred to in the Yuktidīpikā.[64]

Vātsyāyana was well aware of Nāgārjuna's critique of the *pramāṇa* system. Thus he begins his Bhāṣya with an elaborate and important defense of the *pramāṇa* system. Vātsyāyana also supports theism as an element in Nyāya. The Nyāya-sūtras, however, did not contribute unambiguously to the doctrine of a Creator-God. But Vātsyāyana described God as a soul specially endowed with qualities. God possesses eight mystical powers, according to Vātsyāyana, and these powers are the consequences of His merit and concentration.[65]

Let me quote from the beginning of Nyāyabhāṣya where Vātsyāyana defends the *pramāṇa* system against the Mādhyamika attack:

> "Successful activity *(samartha-pravṛtti)* results when the object *(artha)* is cognised by the 'instrument of valid knowledge' *(pramāṇa)*. Hence the instrument of valid knowledge is invariably connected with the object *(arthavat)*.
>
> There is no cognition *(pratipatti)* of object *(artha)* without the instrument of valid knowledge; without cognition of object there is no successful activity. On being aware of the object with the help of the instrument of knowledge, the knower wants either to get it or avoid it. His specific effort *(samīhā)*, prompted by the desire of either getting or avoiding (the object), is called activity *(pravṛtti)*, whose success *(sāmarthya)*, again, lies in its invariable connection with the result *(phala)*. One who thus exerts *(samīhamāna)*, being desirous of getting or avoiding the object, either gets it or avoids it. By object is meant pleasure *(sukha)* and its cause as well as suffering *(duḥkha)* and its cause. Those objects of *pramāṇa* are innumerable *(aparisaṁkhyeya)*, because the species of living beings are inumerable." (Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya, Nyaya Philos., p. 3)
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> "Since *pramāṇa* is invariably related to the object, *pramātā*, *prameya* and *pramiti*, too, become invariably related to the object. How is it so? Because, in the absence of the foremost *(anyatama)* of these (viz. *pramāṇa)*, the right knowledge of the object is not possible. Of these, *pramātā* means one who, being guided by the desire to seek or shun the object, is led to activity. *Pramāṇa* is the instrument by which the knower *(pramātā)* rightly knows the object. *Prameya* is the object rightly known. *Pramiti* is the right knowledge of the object. With these four, *tattva* reaches its fulfilment.
>
> What, then, is *tattva*? (It means) the positivity of the positive (*sat* or *bhava*) and the negativity of the negative (*asat* or *abhava*). When a positive object is known as positive, i.e. as it actually is rather than as its contradictory, it becomes the *tattva* (of *sat* or *bhava*). Again, when a negative object is known as negative, i.e. in its actual nature rather than as its contradictory, it becomes the *tattva* (of *asat* or *abhava*).

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[64] See Yuktidīpikā (ed. P. B. Chakravarti), p. 47–48.

[65] See Vātsyāyana, under Nyāya-sūtra, 4.2.21.

But how can the latter (i.e., the negative or *asat*) be known by a *pramāṇa*? Because, when with the help of a lamp the object which exists there is known, so also the object which is not there is not known (i.e. is known as not existing or *nāsti*). Just as with the help of a lamp the visible object is seen by the observer, similarly that which is not perceived is (known as) not existent; it would have been known like that (i.e. the visible object) if it were there; it is (known as) not existent because there is no perception of it. Thus, when a positive object is known by a *pramāṇa* that which at that time is not known is (known as) not existent. If it were there, it would have been known just like that (i.e. the positive object or *sat*). It is (known as) not existent because it is not perceived.

Therefore, in this way the *pramāṇa* which reveals the existent reveals also the not existent." (The same, p. 56)

The following will illustrate the *sūtra* style of Akṣapāda as well as Vātsyāyana's method of explanation of the sūtras:

Nyāyasūtra 2.2.7 [Setting forth an opponent's view]: "*nābhāvaprāmāṇyaṃ prameyāsiddheḥ.*"

Translation: *Abhāva* is not a means of true cognition, because there is no such object of true cognition as an *absence*.

Vātsyāyana: Since absence is found to be an object in many cases of true cognition, the argument that *abhāva* is not a means of true cognition because there is no such object of true cognition as absence is rather high-handed.

[Vātsyāyana introduces *sūtra* 2.2.8 as follows:] Many examples could be adduced, of which our author now furnishes a simple one.

Nyāyasūtra 2.2.8: "*lakṣiteṣv-alakṣaṇa-lakṣitatvād alakṣitānāṃ tatprameyasiddheḥ.*"

Translation: For, where several [cloths] are marked, since there are those unmarked which are marked [out] by the absence of marks, it is proved that this [viz., absence] is an object of valid cognition.

Vātsyāyana: This absence [which is under discussion] is proved to be a *prameya*. How? Because, when cloths which are marked are not to be taken, those cloths which are not marked and are to be taken are marked [out to us] by the [very] absence of marks on them. A man in the presence of both sorts may be told, "Bring the unmarked cloths," and by means of absence of marks he will cognize those cloths on which no mark appears, and, having cognized them, he will bring them. Here [the cognition of] absence of marks is the cause of his true cognition [that is, it is a *pramāṇa*], which proves that the absence [is a *prameya*, an object of a true cognition].

Nyāyasūtra 2.2.9: "*asaty arthe nābhāva iti cen nānya-lakṣaṇopapatteḥ.*"

Translation: If you say, "[There can be] no absence without the thing's [first] being present," [we say] no, because the mark can be [present] on something else.

Vātsyāyana: [Opponent.] Where a thing has been and ceases to be, there we can speak of absence. But it is not the case that the marks were once on the unmarked cloths and have now ceased to be there. Therefore we cannot speak of absence of marks on them. [The answer to this is] no, because the marks can occur on other things. Just as a man sees the presence of marks on other cloths, just so does he not see marks on the unmarked cloths. By seeing the absence of marks the man cognizes the object [viz., the unmarked cloths] by absence.

Nyāyasūtra 2.2.10 [giving the rejoinder of an opponent]: "*tat-siddher alakṣiteṣv ahetuḥ.*"

Translation: [Opponent.] But the fact that one finds those [viz., the marks on the marked cloths] is no reason for there being [an absence of those] on the unmarked cloths.

Vātsyāyana: There cannot be any absence of those marks that exist in the marked cloths. It is not reasonable to say that the marks that are present in the marked [cloths] are absent from the unmarked, because to speak of the absence of those which are present is a contradiction.

Nyāyasūtra 2.2.11: "*na, lakṣaṇāvasthitāpekṣa-siddheḥ.*"

Translation: [Answer.] No, because [the absence of the marks is] proved by the presence of the marks [elsewhere].

Vātsyāyana: We are not saying that there is an absence of those very marks which are present. What we are saying is that, when marks are present on certain objects, by referring to that fact one may recognize objects on which they are not present by the absence of marks.

Nyāyasūtra 2.2.12: "*prāg utpatter abhāvopapatteś ca.*"

Translation: Also, because there can be an absence prior to a thing's coming into existence.

Vātsyāyana: There are two sorts of absence: where an object is not found prior to its origination and where an object is not found after its destruction. That sort of absence of marks which occurs prior to the production exists in the cloths which are not marked with the marks, not the other sort (i.e., destruction).

(Transl. B. K. Matilal)

Vātsyāyana's Nyāya-bhāṣya was commented upon by several Nyāya authors besides Uddyotakara. These authors were Bhāvivikta, Aviddhakarṇa, Adhyayanapāda and Viśvarūpa. But none of their works survived. Viśvarūpa probably wrote a commentary on Vātsyāyana called Nyāyabhāṣya-ṭīkā even before Uddyotakara. This is justified by Durvekamiśra's reference to Viśvarūpa and Uddyotakara.[66] Vādirāja (a Jaina author) quotes the views of Viśvarūpa in as many as eight places in his Nyāya-viniścaya-vivaraṇa. From this source we learn that Viśvarūpa explained the example of the *pūrvavat* inference, "it will rain, for there is a cloud," as follows: "This cloud is rain-producer, for it is high, dense and black."

The example of the *śeṣavat* inference, "it has rained, for the river is fast-flowing," is explained as follows: "The subject of this inference is the river-bed, and the inferable property is its connection with a rainy place upstream; and the inferential mark is fullness and fast-flowingness of the river." Both Uddyotakara and Jayanta followed this explanation.

Adhyayanapāda is another author mentioned by both Durvekamiśra and Karṇagomin. Bhāsarvajña refers to both Viśvarūpa and Adhyayanapāda while explaining the term *sannikarṣa* (connection) in the Nyāya-sūtra definition of perception.[67] It is probable that Uddyotakara derived his theory of sixfold perceptional connection (see below) from the views of those two Nyāya teachers.

Both Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta have been frequently referred to by Śāntarakṣita in his Tattvasaṃgraha. But it is difficult to decide whether they were prior to Uddyotakara or not. Śāntarakṣita, however, gave equal weight to the following four authors: Bhāvivikta, Uddyotakara, Aviddhakarṇa, and Śaṅkarasvāmin. At one time it was believed that Bhāvivikta was a Nyāya

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[66] See Durvekamiśra, Dharmottarapradīpa, p. 175.

[67] Bhāsarvajña, Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, p. 157.

author. But Cakradhara in his commentary (first published in 1972) on the Nyāyamañjarī, identifies him as a Lokāyata philosopher who wrote a commentary on the Lokāyata-sūtras.[68] He might have preceded Dharmakīrti. Aviddhakarṇa, however, might have been later than both Uddyotakara and Dharmakīrti.

9. *Uddyotakara*

The logical section of Vātsyāyana was severely criticized by Dignāga, the greatest of the Buddhist logicians. Dignāga formulated a *pramāṇa* system of his own and a system of logic describing the valid and invalid forms of inference. Shortly after Dignāga, there appeared, in the Nyāya school, Uddyotakara, a creative philosopher as well as a logician, a worthy successor of Dignāga in the history of Indian logic. He wrote his master-piece, Nyāyavārttika, an extensive commentary on Nyāyabhāṣya and Nyāya-sūtras.

Uddyotakara ("the Enlightener", a distinctive secondary name) belonged to the Bhāradvāja family and was a teacher of the Pāśupata sect. This information can be gathered from the colophon of the fifth chapter of the Nyāyavārttika. This shows that the Nyāya school was already under the influence of the Pāśupata Śaiva sect, just as the Vaiśeṣika school was under the influence of the Māheśvara Śaiva sect beginning from Praśastapāda.

His date can be determined from the following considerations. Subandhu referred to him by name and described him as a well-known Nyāya author in his Vāsavadattā.[69] Bāṇa, in his Harṣacarita, acclaimed the Vāsavadattā as a great *kāvya*.[70] Bāṇa was a contemporary of King Harṣa of Thānesvar etc. (606–646 A.D.). Uddyotakara came soon after Dignāga but preceded Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. Thus he should be placed between 500–600 A.D.

Uddyotakara states at the beginning of his book that he would refute the views of the Buddhist and re-establish the system propounded by Akṣapāda:[71]

> "Akṣapāda, the foremost of sages, propounded a *śāstra* for the peace of the world; and I shall write on it an expository treatise which will dispel the misconception of the quibblers."

The word "quibbler" is explained by the commentator Vācaspati Miśra I as referring to the Buddhists. The whole of Nyāyavārttika is scattered with citations from Dignāga as well as with criticism of Dignāga's views. Uddyotakara frequently used the term *Bhadanta* (honourable Buddhist monk) to refer to Dignāga.

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[68] See Cakradhara, p. 197.
[69] Subandhu, Vāsavadattā (ed. F. Hall), p. 235.
[70] Bāṇa, Harṣacarita, *ucchvāsa* II.
[71] Uddyotakara, p. 1.

It is interesting to compare the concluding verse of Uddyotakara's work with that of Vātsyāyana's:

Vātsyāyana: "I, Vātsyāyana, have composed this bhāṣya on the Nyāya system that was revealed to the sage Akṣapāda, the best of the teachers.'" Uddyotakara: "A great vārttika has thus been composed by me belonging to the Bhāradvāja family on the Bhāṣya which was spoken by Vātsyāyana who was as gifted as Akṣapāda."

Uddyotakara's greatness lies not only in incorporating Dignāga's logical teachings into the Nyāya school but also in the creative reconstruction and expansion of Dignāga's system for posterity. In this matter, he fared better than Praśastapāda. It is true that Uddyotakara criticized Dignāga and sometimes used sophistry to refute the Buddhist master. But Dignāga, in his Pramāṇasamuccaya, was equally critical of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika views, and did not even desist from using sophistry occasionally. In fact, both Dignāga and Uddyotakara, in my opinion, belonged to the same philosophic tradition of mediaeval India where serious philosophic argumentation was usually interspersed with sophistry (cf. the use of *jāti* (refutations by means of contradictory arguments, incorrect posing of questions etc.) in *jalpa* (unfair disputations) and *vitaṇḍā* (destructive criticism)). Mutual influence between the Nyāya and the Buddhist schools of this period cannot be disputed. Thus, Akṣapāda's definition of perception as "non-verbal" was probably the source of inspiration for Dignāga's definition of perception as a cognition untouched by conceptual construction. Similarly, Dignāga's *hetu-cakra* ("the wheel of nine reasonings") was the source of inspiration of Uddyotakara's wheel of the sixteen types of reasonings (logical and dialectical categories).

The doctrine of *trairūpya*, or the three-fold condition of a valid reason, is an important doctrine in the history of Indian logic. Extensive literature on this topic has grown over the ages. The first condition was formulated by Dignāga as follows: "The presence of the reason in the subject or locus." Since Dignāga did not quantify the subject-term here, he left it ambiguous whether the presence of the reason is intended to be in all members of the subject or in some members. Thus Uddyotakara criticized this formulation, for under the second interpretation it would lead to an unsound inference.

Uddyotakara also pointed out that the second condition of a valid reason in Dignāga's formulation would be redundant if the third and the first conditions are interpreted properly without any ambiguity. A possible defense of Dignāga's formulation can be made by inserting a restrictive "only" *(eva)* in the three conditions. But Uddyotakara thought that it was unnecessary. It may be noted that Dharmakīrti defended Dignāga's formulation with the help of the restrictive "only" inserted in proper places. But Vācaspati Miśra I replied that if Dignāga intended that his formulation should be read with restrictive "only" then he should not have rejected the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra regarding the visual perception of colour as well as coloured substance, where a similar interpretation was possible. This will only prove my contention that if Ud-

dyotakara was occasionally unfair to Dignāga, so was Dignāga occasionally to his Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika predecessors.

Uddyotakara criticized only the formulation of the *trairūpya* doctrine by Dignāga, but he accepted the doctrine in principle. He also suggested a logical expansion of the doctrine. Since the reason can be present in all, none or some of the agreeing cases *(sapakṣa)* and similarly in all, none or some of the disagreeing cases *(vipakṣa)*, there can be nine possible combinations of these two conditions. Only two combinations will however generate a sound inference. This was Dignāga's *hetu-cakra* as interpreted by Uddyotakara.

Uddyotakara suggested that if in a particular inference there were no agreeing cases then the second condition need not be fulfilled. In other words, the first and the third conditions will suffice. Besides, Uddyotakara pointed out that if there were no disagreeing cases in a particular form of inference, then the third condition, "presence in no disagreeing cases," should be considered as fulfilled. Thus, in fact, instead of nine possibilities, we will have sixteen possible combinations: presence in all, none, and some agreeing cases, and the non-existence of any agreeing case, being combined with four similar possibilities with the disagreeing cases. This was Uddyotakara's expanded *hetu-cakra*.

Uddyotakara defended the Nyāya definition of perception against the attack by Dignāga. Dignāga pointed out that sense-organs and objects of perception might not be always in contact with each other. Thus, colour cannot be in physical contact with the eye-organ in order to be perceived. To defend the Nyāya doctrine of 'sense-object contact,' Uddyotakara worked out the following six types of connection between the sense and the perceived objects, using the Vaiśeṣika category system:

1) Conjunction, e.g., a pot is perceived being conjoined with the light that comes out of the eye-organ.

2) Inherence in the conjoined, e.g., colour that is perceived inheres in the pot which is conjoined with the eye-organ in the above manner.

3) Inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined, e.g., colourness is perceived because it inheres in the colour that is inherent in the pot which is conjoined with the eye.

4) Inherence, e.g., sound is perceived because it inheres in the ear-organ which is identical with the space delimited by our ear-cavity.

5) Inherence in the inherent, e.g., soundness of sound is perceived in this way.

6) Qualification, e.g., perception of the absence of a pot which qualifies the ground.

Uddyotakara was also the first philosopher to refute Dignāga's theory of *apoha* (words do not signify anything positive, but the mere exclusion of other things). He defended the Nyāya doctrine of the real universal, and criticized the Buddhist view that a word instead of "denoting" a thing directly only

expresses the negation of what the thing is not. He also criticized the idealistic doctrine of Vasubandhu.

Let me quote a long passage from Uddyotakara to illustrate his style and method of argumentation:

"It is not true that the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge are supposed (to be existent) like (the objects in) a magic show, or the appearance of a castle in the cloud, or a mirage. For this (thesis) cannot be proved.

No reason is given when it is asserted that unreal objects are being supposed (to be existent) like dream-objects. What reason is there to maintain that the objects in a dream-experience are unreal?

[Opponent:[The reason is what is called *khyāti* (appearance of objects in experience). The reason for maintaining the thesis, viz., objects that are apprehended at the waking state of consciousness, do not have a separate existence from consciousness, is the appearance of objects as in a dream.

[Answer:] No. Your example (i.e., the dream-example) stands in need of a proof just as does your thesis.

What is the reason for believing that the objects that appear in a dream-experience are not distinct from the (dream-)consciousness?

[Opponent:] The objects do not exist since they are not apprehended by the waking person.

[Answer:] If you think that these objects do not exist just because they are not apprehended by the waking person, then you are wrong. For you have added a qualification (unnecessarily).

It is implied that those objects that are apprehended by the waking person exist. And the qualification, those "that are not apprehended by the waking person" is superfluous.

If you argue that the objects that are apprehended either in the waking experience or in a dream are unreal but the consciousness (of such objects) exists, (we ask:) what could be your reason?

The fact as being not apprehended by the waking person cannot be cited as a reason because it is incapable of establishing the 'contrapositive' (*viparyaya*; viz., apprehension of objects by the waking person proves their existence).

If apprehension proves existence only then it is warranted that non-apprehension can prove non-existence.

It is contended that the reason should be capable of establishing the 'contrapositive' thesis (viz., apprehension proves existence).

[Opponent:] The objects are not distinct from the consciousness (of them) because they are subject to comprehension (by the consciousness) just as a particular feeling (of pain) is. Just as that which is apprehensible *(grāhya)* like a particular feeling, is not distinct from consciousness, so also the objects are not distinct from consciousness.

[Answer:] A feeling is a feeling of either pleasure or pain. Consciousness is a cognitive state (of mind). A cognitive state is distinct from the feeling of pleasure or pain. Therefore, your supporting example is not correct. Pleasure and pain are what are apprehensible, and their apprehension is a cognitive state. Thus, the apprehensible must be distinct from its apprehension.

If you argue that consciousness is identical with the feeling (i.e., pleasure or pain), we still say that there is no supporting example where the apprehensible and the apprehension are (undoubtedly) identified with each other. For, an act and the object to which that act is directed cannot be identical with each other.

If you wish to establish identity (between apprehension and the apprehensible) without caring for the evidences of the means of knowledge, you establish (only)

four 'personality' aggregates (instead of five, by equating feeling with consciousness); and this will contradict your doctrinal position (that there are five 'personality' aggregates, viz., aggregates of matter, feeling, perceptions, mental forces and consciousness).

If you do not accept even four aggregates but admit consciousness only that is (commonly) experienced, we then counter: since there are neither internal nor external objects to account for the distinctness of the states of consciousness, how can you explain the distinction of different states of consciousness?

[Opponent:] One state of consciousness is different from the other just as one dream is different from another.

[Answer:] Even in that case, the distinction of consciousness-states should be explained as owing to the comprehension of (different) things, that are observed and experienced. If, in the case of dreams also, the distinction of consciousness-states is asserted to be owing to the difference of comprehension, then we counter by pointing out the distinction of comprehension from the comprehensible. The comprehensible cannot be identical with comprehension.

All the dream-experiences that reveal cities, birds, gardens and chariots distinctly are erroneous cognitive states. And these erroneous cognitive states originate, sharing the generic features of the waking cognitive states.

[Opponent:] In my theory, all cognitive states will be held to be erroneous.

[Answer:] If you say that, we ask you to point out the 'principal' object *(pradhāna)* in such errors. There cannot be an erroneous cognition which is without any 'principal' object.

Moreover, he who does not accept that the objects are distinct from consciousness, should be countered with the refutation of this reason based upon the examination of its nature.

Is the nature of the object (in a dream) that of being external? If so, then the position becomes contradictory (viz., what is internal in consciousness is said to be external).

Is the nature of the dream-object that of being consciousness? If so, then the dream-object cannot be established because the states of consciousness cannot be communicated to others. For, if the dream of one person is not expressed in words, the other person would not be able to know it.

[Opponent:] The states of consciousness taking the 'forms' of words are conveyed to others.

[Answer:] He who says this should explain the meaning of the word 'form,' *ākāra*. The 'form' (in this context) is the apprehension by which something non-x appears as x depending upon the similarity of the 'principal' object, (e.g., "This is a snake"—this wrong apprehension has taken the 'form' of a snake with regard to something that is not a snake but has similarity with the 'principal object, i.e., a snake).

Also, in your view, words are not real, and hence the sentence "the consciousness-state takes the 'form' of words" is a statement without a reference.

He who does not accept that objects are distinct from consciousness, should also be asked to explain the distinction between a dream and a piece of waking experience. The objects are non-existent as much in waking experience as in the dream; hence, wherefrom could there be such a distinction as reflected in the statement "This is a dream and that is a waking experience?"

Even the discrimination of what begets merit and what begets demerit cannot be established (under your view). For, just as one does not incur demerit by having illicit sexual relations in a dream, so also one would not incur demerit by doing so in the waking state.

[Opponent:] The (said) discrimination is maintained by the fact that in one case the person is overwhelmed with slumber, while he is not so overwhelmed in the other case.

[Answer:] This is also wrong. How does one know that this odd behaviour of the mind is caused by the influence of slumber?

[Opponent:] The clarity and unclarity of the states of consciousness distinguish the dream stage from the waking stage.

[Answer:] You will have to explain the notion of clarity and unclarity without taking recourse to the objects (which are, according to you, non-existent).

[Opponent:] It has been seen that states of consciousness can be distinct even when their objects are non-existent. For example:

The departed spirits originating from the maturation of similar 'residual forces of action' *(karma)* see a river full of filth. No river is actually present there, nor any filth. And one thing cannot be many. But the states of consciousness are seen to be distinct, for some spirits see the same as a river full of water, and some others see it as a river full of blood. Thus it is ascertained that consciousness alone arises in different forms in the manner just described, depending upon its internal conditions while the external objects as its conditioning antecedents do not exist.

[Answer:] This is wrong because it runs into contradiction. If you say that consciousness appears in different forms in this manner while the external condition does not exist, we then ask: How is it so?

If consciousness takes the 'form' of blood, you should explain the status of this blood. What is the status of this blood? In the same way, one should raise questions about the 'form' of water or the 'form' of the river. When each word in the sentence "They see a river of filth," is examined by analysis, the sentence becomes devoid of any objective reference if the aggregates of matter etc. did not exist.

Regulation of place and time is also not possible. The departed spirits see the river full of filth in a particular place, not in just any place whatsoever. If objects did not exist, the reason for such regulation of place would have to be explained.

If, for a person, the existent object is determined by some 'form' or other, then it is proper to hold that some of this cognitive states are erroneous. False cognitive states do not reject (the existence of) the 'principal' object. Thus, one should point out the 'principal' objects in the cognition of the river of filth etc. What applies to the cognition of the river of filth etc. is also applicable to the cases of the magic show, appearance of the castle in the cloud, and mirage-water.

[Opponent:] "You imagine the 'perfuming' of action *(karma)* to be in one place and the result of it in another place" (Vasubandhu, Viṃśikā). The meaning of this (line) is: The (corresponding) result should be there where the action takes place. For him who takes objects to be different from their consciousness, the action will happen in one place while its result will be in another place, and thus the action and its result will have different substrata (but cause and effect are supposed to have the same substratum).

[Answer:] This is not true, for I do not concede the point. I do not concede that the action and its result are occurring in different substrata. The action is located in the self *(ātman)* and the result is also in the same locus. Thus, the (supposed) fault (in my position) is rejected.

The objects (of my consciousness) are different from my consciousness because they possess generic features as well as specific features. They are distinct just as my consciousness-series is distinct from the consciousness belonging to another personality-series (i.e., another person).

The objects are different from consciousness because they can be established

(as external) by means of knowledge. Also because they are 'effects' (*kārya*, 'causally conditioned'), they are temporal, and they are preceded by residual traces of action *(dharma)*."

(Transl. B. K. Matilal, in Buddhist studies for Horner, p. 163)

The Nyāya conception of God was also developed by Uddyotakara. Thus, the Nyāya school became unequivocally theistic from Uddyotakara onwards. He concluded his theological discussion quoting two verses from the Āgama:

> "A being is ignorant, and not a master of its own sorrows and happiness. Being impelled by the Lord it goes to Heaven or Hell. When the Lord is awake, the whole world acts; when He rests peacefully, everything closes itself."[72]

10. Some Lost Nyāya Works in the Post-Uddyotakara Period

A period of about four or five centuries intervenes between Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra I, who wrote his Tātparya-ṭīkā on the Nyāyavārttika. Several outstanding Nyāya authors appeared during this space of time. But with the notable exception of Bhāsarvajña and Jayanta, works of none of these authors have come down to us. I shall mention here three Nyāya authors whose books are lost to us.

Śaṅkara

He was a Naiyāyika, who wrote a treatise called Sthirasiddhi. Ratnakīrti, the Buddhist author, cites a passage from this work in his Sthirasiddhi-dūṣaṇa.[73] According to Udayana's Tātparya-pariśuddhi, Vācaspati Miśra I is supposed to have referred to Śaṅkara's view on the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. Udayana refers twice to Śaṅkara by name in this connection.[74] Both Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti criticized Śaṅkara in their works. The former mentioned Śaṅkara's name prior to Trilocana and Bhāsarvajña. This might indicate that Śaṅkara preceded both Trilocana and Bhāsarvajña. Ratnakīrti referred to Śaṅkara as "the beast among the beasts," because the latter showed disrespect towards the respectable Buddhist master Dharmakīrti.[75] This will place Śaṅkara after Dharmakīrti. Śaṅkara was described by Udayana in his Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa as a leading author who differed from the traditional Nyāya views of the Nyāya-bhāṣya and the Nyāyavārttika. We should, however, distinguish this Śaṅkara from the great Śaṅkara of the Advaita Vedānta, as well as from the Śaṅkarasvāmin of the Buddhist school (mentioned also by Jayanta).

[72] See Uddyotakara under Nyāya-sūtra 4.1.21.
[73] See Ratnakīrti, p. 108.
[74] See D. C. Bhattacharya, 1958, p. 33.
[75] See Ratnakīrti, p. 114.

Sānātani

The name of this Naiyāyika is found first in Udayana's Tātparya-pariśuddhi, and then in Vardhamāna's Tattvabodha.[76] He probably wrote a commentary on the fifth chapter of the Nyāya-sūtras. Udayana preserved one of the independent views of Sānātani: There are four types of philosophic debates, according to Sānātani, instead of the usual three found in Nyāya-sūtras 1.2.3–1.2.7. Sānātani interpreted a cavil *(vitaṇḍā)* as having two forms: a *jalpa* degenerating into a cavil, and a *vāda* degenerating into a cavil. Both Śaṅkara Miśra and Vācaspati Miśra II referred to this view of Sānātani. He probably hailed from Bengal, for Udayana described him as "an ancient Gauḍa Naiyāyika."

Trilocana

He was the well-known teacher of Vācaspati Miśra I. The latter paid respect to his teacher, Trilocana, under Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4. Vācaspati interpreted the adjectives "non-verbal" and "non-dubious" in Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4 as indicating the non-judgmental and the judgmental types of perception respectively. This novel interpretation was found neither in Vātsyāyana nor in Uddyotakara. Hence Vācaspati said that he had learnt this interpretation directly from his teacher, Trilocana.

Jñānaśrīmitra paid high tribute to Trilocana by calling him one of the four pillars of the Nyāya school. Ratnakīrti cited a passage from Trilocana's Nyāyaprakīrṇaka.[77] But probably the main work of Trilocana was called Nyāyamañjarī or Mañjarī. Durveka Miśra cited from the Nyāyabhāṣya-ṭīkā of Trilocana, which might have been another name of the Nyāyamañjarī. Durveka also described Trilocana as one belonging to the Karṇāṭa country. The well-known definition of pervasion or concomitance *(vyāpti)* as the natural, unconditional relation was due to Trilocana.

11. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa

Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī holds a unique place in the history of Nyāya literature. It is written as an independent commentary on the important sections of the Nyāya-sūtras. Jayanta, a Kashmirian, was a creative philosopher. His Nyāyamañjarī substantiates this fact. Jayanta was also a poet. He wrote a drama called Āgamaḍambara. He was both an imaginative writer and an original thinker. His style is highly poetic. His prose writing is intermixed with verses and beautiful similes and metaphors. There is also a touch of humour

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[76] D. C. BHATTACHARYA, 1958, p. 19—20; never published.
[77] See Ratnakīrti, p. 18.

and wit in almost every page of the Nyāyamañjarī. The author makes a very modest claim at the beginning of his work:

> "How can we discuss any new fact or truth? One should consider novelty only in rephrasing the older truths of the ancient in modern terminology."[78]

But contrary to the above statement, the Nyāyamañjarī can very well be regarded as one of the most original contributions to the Nyāya literature.

Jayanta's opponents were mainly the Buddhists (Dharmakīrti and his followers) and the Mīmāṃsakas (Kumārila, etc.). In fact very few Nyāya texts covered so much Buddhist material as the Nyāyamañjarī and the Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa. But unfortunately later Buddhist authors such as Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti seldom took notice of Jayanta's view. Some Jaina authors such as Prabhācandra, on the other hand, paid tribute to him and discussed his views. It is possible that Jayanta's work did not receive wider circulation among the Buddhists. Cakradhara, in the twelfth century A.D., wrote a brief commentary on Jayanta called Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhaṅga.[79]

Jayanta's son, Abhinanda, wrote the Kādambarī-kathāsāra, in which he gave some information about his father's personal history. His ancestors came from Gauḍa (Bengal) to Kashmir and settled in the village called Gauramūlaka. Jayanta's great-grandfather was a minister of King Lalitāditya (750 A.D.) of Kashmir. Jayanta was associated with the reign of King Śaṅkaravarman (885–902 A.D.).

The chronology of Jayanta, Bhāsarvajña, and Vācaspati Miśra I has been a matter of great controversy among scholars. S. C. Vidyābhūṣana wrongly placed Jayanta after Vācaspati.[80] Many other scholars repeated the mistaken view that both Bhāsarvajña and Vācaspati preceded Jayanta. One reason for this mistake was that Nyāyakalikā, another short work of Jayanta, was believed to be a commentary on Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyasāra. This confusion started from a curious passage of Guṇaratna's Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya-vṛtti. Guṇaratna said, "There are eighteen commentaries on the Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajña; of them, the chief one is the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. Nyāyakalikā is composed by Jayanta."[81] Due to an unfortunate misconstruing of this statement of Guṇaratna, scholars thought that the Nyāyakalikā was only a commentary of the Nyāyasāra. But the text of the Nyāyakalikā has been published afterwards in 1925. And it has been found to be a simple manual written by Jayanta on the sixteen Nyāya categories.

In Udayana's Tātparyapariśuddhi it is noted, under sūtra 1.1.6, that Vācaspati Miśra I refuted a view of Jayanta. Thus, accepting the authority of Udayana, we place Jayanta prior to Vācaspati. And Bhāsarvajña was later

[78] See Jayanta, Nyāyamañjarī, introductory verses.

[79] This work has recently been edited and published by Dr. N. Shah, L. D. Series, Ahmedabad 1972.

[80] See Vidyābhūṣaṇa, p. 147.

[81] Guṇaratna, Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya-vṛtti, p. 138.

than Vācaspati, as we shall see below. Thus, Jayanta was the earliest of the above mentioned three Nyāya authors. This also explains why Gaṅgeśa referred to Jayanta as "the old Naiyāyika" *(jaran-naiyāyika)*. Jayanta quotes a verse from Māgha, the well-known Sanskrit poet. But this will not upset our dating of this Nyāya author between 850—900 A.D.

Jayanta frequently referred to two groups of Nyāya authors: *ācāryas* and *vyākhyātṛs*. Cakradhara explained that the first group here comprised those who commented upon Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika, and the second group referred to those who wrote commentaries on the Nyāyabhāṣya.[82]

The Nyāyamañjarī was written while Jayanta apparently was either in prison or had gone into exile in a forest. In Chapter VI Jayanta added that he was not writing this book out of pride, but only for the purpose of pleasing himself in doing something worthwhile at a time when he was forced by the king to spend his days "in the soundless den." What was the cause of this unfortunate turn of his fate, we do not know. Jayanta himself did not explain. Nor did he express any malice towards the king in any of this writings. According to Cakradhara, however, Jayanta was not really imprisoned, but simply forced "to live in a place called *Khasadeśa* which was a forest region."[83]

12. Bhāsarvajña

Bhāsarvajña (or Bhāvasarvajña) wrote a very short treatise called Nyāyasāra and then a very elaborate work called Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (technically a commentary on his own Nyāyasāra). He belonged to Kashmir, and might have been a senior contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra I. Svāmī Yogīndrānanda, editor of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, thinks that Bhāsarvajña made disguised references to Vācaspati's views in many places.[84] But both D. C. Bhattacharya[85] and A. Thakur[86] hold that he was senior to Vācaspati. For, Śrīvallabha pointed out that Vācaspati under Nyāya-sūtra 2.1.39 had refuted a view that belonged to Bhāsarvajña.[87]

Bhāsarvajña was later than Trilocana. For Bhaṭṭa Rāghava pointed out in his commentary on the Nyāyasāra that this author referred to the view of Trilocana.[88] He belonged to Kashmir. But he was more fortunate than Jayanta, for within a very short period he became very popular in Northern and Western India. His short tract, the Nyāyasāra, was commented upon by various scholars. It was influenced by the Vaiśeṣika school and had a leaning to Śaivism. According

[82] Cakradhara, p. 44.
[83] See Cakradhara, p. 167.
[84] Yogīndrānanda, Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, p. 11.
[85] D. C. Bhattacharya, 1958, p. 28.
[86] A. Thakur, Introduction to Ratnakīrti, p. 24—26.
[87] Śrīvallabha, p. 283.
[88] D. C. Bhattacharya, 1958, p. 16.

to Guṇaratna, there were as many as eighteen commentaries on this Nyāyasāra.[89] But Bhāsarvajña's fame was mainly due to his great work Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, which was described by Vādidevasūri as "the great ocean." He was often referred to as Bhūṣaṇa-kāra ("the author of the Bhūṣaṇa").

Bhāsarvajña propounded several 'unorthodox' views in the Nyāya system. Thus he was called a "Nyāyaikadeśin." For example, he held that the Vaiśeṣika qualities and actions (*guṇa* and *karma*) should be subsumed under one category, viz. quality. He also held that the system of four *pramāṇas* of the Nyāya school should be reduced to three, perception, inference and the verbal testimony. All these views were criticized by Udayana. His style was lucid and simple, although sometimes he gave very strenuous explanations of certain Nyāya-sūtras.[90] There are also two commentaries on the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa by such authors as Vasudevasuri (a Jaina scholar), and Gadādharamiśra.

13. Vācaspati Miśra I

Vācaspati has been extolled by later Indian philosophers as "the master of all systems" *(sarvatantrasvatantra)*. He wrote on all the five systems of Indian philosophy, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. We are concerned here with two of his works, the Nyāyasūcīnibandha, where the Sūtras of Akṣapāda are collected in order and divided into sections and subsections, and the Nyāyavārttika-tātparyaṭīkā, an extensive commentary on Uddyotakara. Vācaspati said in his Nyāyasūcīnibandha that he wrote it in the year 898. According to D. C. Bhattacharya, this date, in the light of other available evidence, should be identified as 898 Śaka era, i.e., 976–77 A.D. Thus, Vācaspati was a contemporary of Śrīdhara, the Vaiśeṣika author. While Śrīdhara belonged to Bengal, Vācaspati belonged to Mithilā.[91]

Vācaspati was not highly original as a Nyāya author, but as a commentator he certainly held a very high place. Later Nyāya authors respectfully referred to him as the Tātparyācārya ('the teacher of the intrinsic significance'). Even Gaṅgeśa referred to him by name in the Pakṣatā section of the Tattvacintāmaṇi. Vācaspati defended Uddyotakara against the attack of the great Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti (ca. 650) and others. He respectfully referred to his teacher, Trilocana. His novel interpretation of the two types of perception was derived from Trilocana's teachings. He frequently quoted from, and refuted, such authors as Dignāga, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. He referred to Uddyota-

[89] Guṇaratna, Commentary on the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, p. 138.

[90] For example, Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4, enumerating the four *pramāṇas*, was explained by Bhāsarvajña as implying only three *pramāṇas*. See Bhāsarvajña, Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, p. 81.

[91] D. C. Bhattacharya, 1958, p. 29.

kara's writing as *ati-jaratī* ("very ancient"), which might explain the long time-gap between him and Uddyotakara.

Several Nyāya authors appeared between Vācaspati and Udayana, such as Aniruddha, Vittoka and Śatānanda. But most of their works did not survive. Aniruddha wrote the Vivaraṇapañjikā on the Nyāyabhāṣya, Vārttika, and the Tātparyaṭīkā. A manuscript of this work has recently been discovered, and Prof. A. Thakur is engaged in editing it. Udayana referred to Aniruddha as Vivaraṇakāra, and even Rudra Tarkavāgīśa in 1668 A.D. referred to him by name in his Dīdhiti-ṭīkā.[92] Vittoka might have written some treatise on the Nyāya conception of God, for both Ratnakīrti and Jñānaśrīmitra referred to him while they were refuting the notion of God.

14. Udayana

Udayana holds a crucial position in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. I have already discussed his contribution to the Vaiśeṣika literature. As many as seven books of Udayana are available today:

1) Lakṣaṇāvalī, a short Vaiśeṣika manual, 2) Lakṣaṇamālā, a collection of definitions of important Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concepts, 3) Ātmatattvaviveka, an independent treatise (also called Bauddhadhikkāra "A reproach to the Buddhists") on soul against the Buddhist doctrine of Universal flux, 4) Nyāyakusumāñjali, another independent work providing a rational defense of the concept of God, 5) Tātparyapariśuddhi, also called Nibandha, a sub-commentary on Tātparyaṭīkā, and a very authoritative text on the traditional Nyāya, 6) Nyāyapariśiṣṭa or Prabodhasiddhi, a separate commentary on the Vāda section (fifth chapter) of the Nyāya-sūtras, and 7) Kiraṇāvalī, a commentary on Praśastapāda.

In connexion with the Tātparyapariśuddhi it may be observed that it is the last of a chain of five works (Nyāyasūtra, Nyāyabhāṣya, Nyāyavārttika, Tātparyaṭika and Tātparyapariśuddhi) which together constitute the 'orthodox' Nyāya doctrine.

Udayana belonged to Mithilā. He was a very influential and powerful writer. His abstruse style and philosophic technique became almost the standard method which later philosophers tried to follow. He can rightly be called the 'father' of the Navya-nyāya school. One may add that in Udayana the happy marriage between Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika became complete. The two traditions thus merged into one and one became almost indistinguishable from the other.

Udayana's pre-eminence as a philosopher can hardly be overestimated. All his important works were, in course of time, endowed with a chain of commentaries and sub-commentaries. Both Nyāyakusumāñjali and Ātmatattva-

[92] See D. C. Bhattacharya, 1958, p. 7.

viveka became standard books of reference for later writers. Udayana's logical theories, which formed the basis of Navya-nyāya logic, were mostly developed when he defended the notion of God and soul. In this respect, he resembles St. Thomas Aquinas of Europe.

In the Ātmatattvaviveka, Udayana refuted the four philosophical schools of Buddhism, Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika. His main target was, however, his immediate predecessor, Jñānaśrīmitra. In the Nyāyakusumāñjali he criticized the five outstanding philosophical schools, Cārvāka, Mīmāṃsā, Buddhist, Jaina, and Sāṃkhya. For a clear and explicit formulation of the law of contradiction and excluded middle in the Indian tradition, we can refer to the Nyāyakusumāñjali, Ch. 3, 8:

> "Between a thing and its contradictory, there is no third way. And there cannot be also unity of two contradictories, for the mere statements of them will cancel each other."

Let me cite here a long passage from Udayana's Ātmatattvaviveka where he refutes the Buddhist position on the doctrine of momentariness. This passage is almost a classic example of Udayana's style and argumentation:

> "By such arguments, the negative method of inferring momentariness of an entity from its existence is also rejected.
>
> Besides, there are some other defects in this negative inference. The minor term (the 'subject' *pakṣa*), the middle term (the 'inferential reason' *hetu*) and the example cited in such an inference cannot be established by any means of knowledge. There cannot be any means of knowledge to establish a non-entity (i.e., a fiction, *avastu*). If it could be established by some means of knowledge it ceases to be a non-entity.
>
> (Opponent:) If so, then your talk about the non-entity becomes self-contradictory.
>
> (Proponent:) Does this self-contradiction point out that there is a means of knowledge to establish the non-entity? Or, (second question) does it reject the prohibitive statement that we should not talk about non-entity? Or, (third question) does it imply that we must concede such statements (about non-entity) which are unauthenticated, i.e., not established by any means of knowledge?
>
> The first alternative is not tenable. Even a thousand of self-contradictions cannot conceivably show that (the non-entity like) the stable object (i.e., the minor term) or the absence of gradual efficiency etc. (i.e., the *hetu*) or the rabbit's horn (i.e., the example cited to support the general premise) is amenable to (a means of knowledge such as) perception and inference. If it could, what is the use of this silly fight over the nature of non-entities?
>
> The second alternative is acceptable to us because we admit only valid means of knowledge.
>
> (Opponent:) If the prohibitive statement is rejected, no statement with regard to non-entities will be possible.
>
> (Proponent:) What else can we do but remain silent in regard to a matter where statement of any kind would be logically incongruent? Silence is better in such cases. (No statement is better than any statement in such matters.) Please consider yourself who is the better of the two: One who is making statements about entities that cannot be established by any means of knowledge? Or, the other person who remains speechless (on such occasions)?

(Opponent:) But, although you are a wise man, you have not remained silent yourself. You, on the other hand, have made a prohibitive statement with regard to our talk about non-entities!

(Proponent:) True. In order to avoid a self-contradictory object not established by any means of knowledge, you have conceded that one can make statements about the non-existent. Similarly, in order not to allow any statement about the non-entities in our discourse on the means of knowledge, we concede that a self-contradictory statement (prohibiting the use of non-entities) is possible although it is not supported by any means of knowledge. If you treated both the cases in the same manner, we would not have said anything about non-entities. (We have made the above self-contradictory statement because you first raised the question).

To the third question we say the following: By whose command, may we ask you, one has to accept (in a philosophical discourse statements about) an object which is not established by any means of knowledge?

(Opponent:) Because use of such statements is deeply rooted in our habit (speech-behaviour).

(Proponent:) It will be a self-contradiction to claim that something which cannot be established by any means of knowledge can be deeply rooted in our speech-behaviour. (We speak about objects that appear in our experience and a non-entity cannot appear in our experience and hence cannot be spoken about).

(Opponent:) Such entities are somehow established (through, for example, some wrong cognition).

(Proponent:) If it is an unreal entity it can never be established through any means of knowledge. If it is established by a means of knowledge, then we ask you to describe that means of knowledge. In *vāda*, i.e., the philosophic debate whose object is to seek truth, we expect you state the means of knowledge.

In the case of *jalpa* 'a philosophic debate whose sole object is to defeat the opponent' or in *vitaṇḍā* 'a philosophic debate whose sole object is to defeat without establishing any position' too, we will not be guilty of self-contradiction because we simply ask you about the means of knowledge by which your *pakṣa* 'minor term' etc. are established. It is impossible as well as undesirable for you to answer by supplying the means of knowledge. If you answer without supplying the means of knowledge, then your own statement will be self-defeating because you have to admit yourself that there is no means of knowledge to establish your *pakṣa* 'minor term' etc. And if you do not answer at all you will meet the defeat-situation' *(nigrahasthāna)* called *a-pratibhā*, 'silence due to lack of intelligence.' [Read '*pakṣādiṣu*' instead of '*praśnādiṣu*'].

If you could avoid self-contradiction by only conceding statements about non-entities (like the rabbit's horn) we could have allowed such an expedient. But this is not so. There is no lack of self-contradiction when we say that *something* with regard to which no statement can be made, can be the subject of a denial or a prohibitive statement.

(Opponent:) How can there be self-contradiction if we say (rephrasing our position) that a non-entity cannot be the subject of any affirmative statement?

(Proponent:) Oh! (Then we ask the following question:) Do you or do you not speak about something which can never be the subject of any affirmation or denial? In either way you will contradict yourself. In either case, that *something* would be a non-entity because a real entity cannot be such that we cannot make any statement about it.

If you say no to the above question, then it will contradict the very statement "(something) can never be the subject of any affirmation or denial." If you, on the other hand, say yes (that is, if you admit that we can speak about something

which can never be the subject of any affirmation or denial), then contradiction will appear as soon as we discuss the nature of that object (that *something*). It does not hold that something cannot be talked about, i.e., affirmed or denied, and, at the same time, it can be talked about (in the manner just stated).

If you insist that a non-entity can be the subject of a denial (i.e., a negative statement), we would ask: why can it not be the subject of an affirmation too? The lack of an accredited means of knowing (such a non-entity) remains the same in both the cases.

(Opponent:) That the son of a barren woman does not speak can be proved (established) by pointing out that he is not a conscious being. But there is no way of proving that the son of a barren woman does speak. (Thus, we prefer the negative statements).

(Proponent:) No. Even to prove that (the son of a barren woman does speak) you can assign the reason that he is a son (of someone and hence can speak). You cannot say that the son of a barren woman is not a son because if you do you will contradict yourself.

(Opponent:) It is a mere statement (viz., "the son of a barren woman"), in fact there is no real son of a barren woman. (Hence no contradiction).

(Proponent:) No. Even the lack of consciousness (which you adduced as your reason to prove lack of speech in the son of a barren woman) will be treated in the same manner. (One might say: "the lack of consciousness in the son of a barren woman" is a mere phrase there being no real son who lacks consciousness.) "Lack of consciousness" refers (in fact) to another nature which is different from consciousness.

(Opponent:) We simply want to deny (possession of) consciousness here, and this is quite possible.

(Proponent:) No. In our case also we will say then that we simply want to deny (possession of) the property of not being a son.

(Opponent:) Our mere denial of not being a son (human offspring) cannot by itself prove the presence of activity and speech. Thus, how can we adduce a reason *(hetu)* without including another competent, determinable (and positive) object (in our *hetu*)? (Denial cannot reveal an entity which we can use as our 'reason' *hetu*).

(Proponent:) No. The same principle will apply to lack of consciousness.

(Opponent:) An object only in the form of a negation of the contradictory possibilities can be used as the reason (to prove anything). For example, the nature of being a *śiṃśapa* tree is adduced as the reason (in the inference: it is a tree because it is a *śiṃśapa* tree) because the nature of being a *śiṃśapa* means the negation of its not being a *śiṃśapa*. The son of a barren woman, on the other hand, not simply excludes (i.e., negates) the possibility of being a pot etc. (the contradictory possibilities) but also excludes the possibility of being a son (a human offspring) like Devadatta (which is not a contradictory possibility). Therefore, the nature of being the son of a barren woman cannot be adduced as the 'reason' *(hetu)*.

(Proponent:) The lack of consciousness (in the son of a barren woman) can also be treated in the same manner. It is not the case that the son of a barren woman (who lacks consciousness) excludes only such conscious beings as Devadatta and not also the unconscious objects such as a piece of wood.

(Opponent:) Speech is a property which is present only in real entities. Thus, in the face of contradiction, how can the presence of speech be proved in a non-entity?

(Proponent:) Through what means of knowledge can this contradiction be

established ? Is it because we apprehend non-entities always without speech ? Or, because we do not apprehend speech divorced from a real entity ?

A non-entity can never be apprehended through any means of knowledge. If it could, it will not be a non-entity. The latter alternative is also not tenable because we will be in the same predicament. Just as speech as divorced from any real entity cannot be established, so also lack of speech divorced from any real entity cannot be proved by any means of knowledge.

(Opponent:) There is only a conceptual construction of the lack of connection between the property speech and the subject.

(Proponent:) What can stop a 'conceptual construction' *(vikalpa)* of the connection between speech and the subject ?

(Opponent:) To be a speaker means to produce speech. How can such a productive power be present in a non-entity which is (supposed to be) devoid of all power to do anything ?

(Proponent:) How can there be even lack of speech ? For, lack of speech means the character of producing what is not speech. (Speechlessness implies doing something else).

(Opponent:) It is not contradictory to say that if there is lack of every power to do anything then there is also the lack of the power to speak.

(Proponent:) By what means of knowledge can it be established that the son of a barren woman lacks all power to do anything ?

(Opponent:) It lacks all power because it is a non-entity.

(Proponent:) How can you establish that it is a non-entity ?

(Opponent:) Because it lacks all power to do anything.

(Proponent:) In this way you are only moving here and there uttering mere words and trying to avoid the issue, just as a penniless borrower of money tries to avoid the money-lender. And you are not seeing the vicious circle (the defect of mutual dependence).

(Opponent:) It is a non-entity because it lacks both gradual efficiency and simultaneous efficiency. (If something cannot produce a thing either gradually or simultaneously, it is a non-entity).

(Proponent:) No. In order to prove such lack of gradual or simultaneous efficiency, you have to adduce a means of knowledge. If the nature of being a son is applied to it, all other properties, such as being able to speak that invariably go along with being a son, can also be applied to it. Thus, how can there be any scope of proving the lack of gradual and simultaneous efficiency in it ? How can there be any scope of proving that it is a non-entity ? And, how can there be any charge of proving the lack of speech etc. ? Therefore, it is our accredited means of knowledge only which is the limit within which our speech behaviour should operate. If this limit is transgressed, there will certainly be chaos."

(Transl. B. K. Matilal, Journ. of Ind. Philos. 1, p. 103)

It may be noticed that the tradition of writing sub-commentaries on the traditional texts of the Nyāya school continued even after Udayana's Tātparyapariśuddhi. Abhayatilaka, a Jaina author of the fourteenth century A.D., wrote the Nyāyālaṅkāraṭippaṇa, a sub-commentary on all the four Nyāya works on the Nyāya-sūtras: Nyāyabhāṣya, Nyāyavārttika, Tātparyaṭīkā, and Tātparyapariśuddhi. This work is also called Pañca-prasthāna.

Chapter III

NAVYA-NYĀYA

15. *The Beginning of Navya-nyāya*

"Navya-nyāya" was the name given to the New school of Nyāya which was in fact the combined tradition of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. In this school the *pramāṇa* theory, specially the theory of inference, gradually rose to prominence. It accepted the four *pramāṇas* of the early Nyāya, and the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika school. Navya-nyāya literature is characterized by an intricate and abstruse style and analogous philosophic technicalities. Here a preliminary definition of some philosophic concept is gradually expanded by the insertion of various qualifications so that the definition becomes precise and free from any over-extension or narrowness. The later exponents of this school became more and more interested in this technique and the methodology of definition, and concentrated their effort on the clarification of the two broad sections of this system, inference and verbal testimony which included also the relationship between word and meaning.

Gaṅgeśa of Mithilā is often said to be the founder of the school. But, as D. C. Bhattacharya has shown, Gaṅgeśa only consolidated this new school while its real founder was Udayana.[93] It may be added that Śrīharṣa also contributed indirectly to the development of Navya-nyāya. He attacked Udayana and refuted each definition of Nyāya categories by developing very intricate and technical arguments. The later Naiyāyikas, thus, defended Udayana using similar technicalities. In this way, I think, the philosophic activity in India took a distinct turn. Besides, the contribution of Buddhist scholars such as Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, as well as of some Vedāntins who introduced such a mind-boggling inference-pattern called "Mahāvidyā," should not be forgotten in this connection.

Śrīvallabha and Vādi-vāgīśvara belonged to the post-Udayana period in Navya-nyāya. I have discussed them in the chapter on the Vaiśeṣika school. Śivāditya was another influential writer of this age. His major book, Lakṣaṇamālā (based on the Mahāvidyā inference), is unfortunately lost to us. Gaṅgeśa quoted from Śivāditya an entire verse, which probably belonged to this lost work. More than a dozen quotations from Śivāditya's lost works are found in Citsukha and Vādīndra. He has been described as "the follower of the

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[93] See D. C. Bhattacharya, 1958, p. 1.

modern crooked path" by his opponents. This characterization may refer either to Sivāditya's personal style or to the Navya-nyāya methodology in general.

The Saptapadārthī, the only text of Śivāditya that has come down to us, is however a simple, elementary manual describing the seven categories of the Navya-nyāya school. Śivāditya agrees with Śrīdhara as regards the interpretation of darkness as an entity. The Saptapadārthi became a very popular manual and was adorned with several commentaries (including that of a Jaina author, Jinavardhana).

Keśava Miśra wrote another elementary manual on Navya-nyāya, the Tarkabhāṣā, which became very popular in the later period. It is not known whether Keśava belonged to Mithilā. But he respectfully referred to Udayana's views. Vardhamāna (Gaṅgeśa's son) is the author of a commentary on this Tarkabhāṣā. D. C. Bhattacharya placed this text in the middle of the twelfth century A.D.[94] This work is divided into two broad sections, *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. At one time, it was read in the seminaries all over India. It had several commentaries. Guṇaratna, a well-known Jaina author of the seventeenth century A.D., wrote a very detailed sub-commentary called Tarkataraṅginī, using the elaborate Navya-nyāya techniques, on Govardhana's Prakāśa commentary on the Tarkabhāṣā. Another Jaina author, Śubhavijayagaṇi, wrote a Vārttika (aphoristic and complementary explanation of a *sūtra*) on this work.

16. *Maṇikaṇṭha and Śaśadhara*

Saśadhara and Maṇikaṇṭha were the two pre-Gaṅgeśa authorities on Navya-nyāya. Fortunately, texts of both authors are available to us today. Maṇikaṇṭha described himself as a Tīrabhuktīya Miśra (which probably referred to the place of origin). He also said that he was the chief justice of a certain king. His book Nyāyaratna is divided into thirteen sections and covers all the important concepts of the Navya-nyāya theory of inference. He was the first to refute Śrīharṣa's criticism of Udayana regarding the problem of induction. Even Gaṅgeśa elaborated this problem by using Maṇikaṇṭha's method. Maṇikaṇṭha rejected the doctrine of *sāmānya-lakṣaṇā*, which Gaṅgeśa defended. In this matter, Maṇikaṇṭha was followed by Raghunātha, who also rejected *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* about three centuries later. Maṇikaṇṭha was the last Navya-nyāya author who added a concluding chapter dealing with the refutation of Mahāvidyā inference. He also dealt with the debate-categories of the old Nyāya such as quibble, futile rejoinder and defeat-situation. He probably belonged to 1300 A.D.

Mention must be made of Vādīndra in this connection. He wrote his celebrated Mahāvidyā-viḍambana in which the Mahāvidyā inference cited by the

[94] See D. C. Bhattacharya, 1958, p. 65—66.

neo-Vedāntins was refuted. Vādīndra's text was popular and was commented upon by the Jaina authors. He might have been a senior contemporary of Maṇikaṇṭha.

Śaśadhara's Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa is a large Navya-nyāya treatise divided into twenty-six (or twenty-seven)[95] sections. The first section is called Maṅgalavāda which definitely influenced later writers to deal at length with the problem of *maṅgala*. Most sections deal with the major problems of perception, inference and causality. The book also contains sections on the nature of *mokṣa*, on the combination of knowledge and action leading to *mokṣa*, and on God. Gaṅgeśa was influenced by Śaśadhara in his argument to prove the existence of God.

Both Śaśadhara and Maṇikaṇṭha gave several alternative definitions of 'pervasion,' which inspired Gaṅgeśa to write his most illuminating section on that subject *(vyāpti)*. Śaśadhara referred to Udayana with great respect on several occasions and quoted a verse from the Nyāyakusumāñjali. He also referred to Vādi-vāgīśvara by name. D. C. Bhattacharya thinks that Śaśadhara belonged to Mithilā and that his date was very close to that of Gaṅgeśa. But I have argued elsewhere that he might have come from Western India and flourished probably more than a century earlier than Gaṅgeśa.[96] Śeṣānanta wrote a commentary on Śaśadhara while Nṛsiṃhayajvan commented upon Maṇikaṇṭha's Nyāyaratna. Both these commentators belonged to Southern India.

There were several other authors who preceded Gaṅgeśa, such as Cāndra, Divākara, Prabhākara, Taraṇimiśra, Sondaḍa and Sarvajñanārāyaṇa. But none of their works has come down to us. This Prabhākara should be distinguished from the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsaka. Gaṅgeśa cites a long passage from Prabhākara's writings under a subsection of *Vyāpti*. It is probable that both Prabhākara and Divākara wrote separate commentaries on Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali.[97]

17. Gaṅgeśa

Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi was the most influential text of Navya-nyāya. What D. C. Bhattacharya observed seems to be quite correct:[98]

> "Gaṅgeśa's achievement is quite unique in the history of philosophical literature of India. There is no other scholar in the whole mediaeval period who had such a

[95] The first edition of this text has 26 sections. But a new manuscript has been discovered where 27 sections are shown. See my forthcoming edition of Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad.

[96] See my introduction to the Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa (forthcoming).

[97] See D. C. Bhattacharya, 1958, p. 66—82.

[98] Ibid., p. 96; see also Frauwallner, 1965 and 1970.

spectacular success through one single book. The Tattvacintāmaṇi, a treatise of about 12000 *granthas* in extent [one *grantha* = 32 syllables] appeared like a flash to dispel the gloom of centuries succeeding Udayana and laid the solid foundation of Indian dialectics."

This elaborate text deals exclusively with *pramāṇas* (means of knowledge) and is divided into four parts. Each part deals with one of the four *pramāṇas* of the Nyāya school. There are forty-six sections in these four parts (12+17+1+16). The part or section on inference is the largest of all. It also contains an elaborate section on the problem of God as an appendix. On the whole this was a comprehensive book, and Gaṅgeśa's style, precision and uniformity, his logical ordering of thoughts and arguments became the model for all later writers. Most of these later writers earned their fame by writing a commentary or a sub-commentary on any section or sub-section of the Tattvacintāmaṇi. Sometimes Gaṅgeśa's style was so concise that even a single sentence of his book was later developed and elaborated by his commentators into a separate work of considerable length.

To illustrate how Gaṅgeśa formulates different alternative definitions of *vyāpti* "pervasion" let me quote below what is usually called the group of five definitions *(pañca-lakṣaṇī)*:

> "27.2—31.2. What is pervasion in that knowledge of a pervasion which is the cause of a conclusion? It is not [the reason's] non-deviation [from the probandum]. For that cannot be (1) [the reason's] non-occurrence in the loci of absence of the probandum, (2) [the reason's] non-occurrence in the loci of absence of the probandum which are different from locus of the probandum, (3) [the reason's] having no common locus with a mutual absence whose counterpositive is locus-of-the-probandum, (4) [the reason's] being the counterpositive of an absence resident in all loci of absense of the probandum, or (5) [the reason's] non-occurrence in what is other than locus of the probandum, since it would then fail to apply in the case of universal positives." (Transl. C. Goekoop, p. 60)

The first part on perception is very important, but it did not become popular with the later writers. Only two sections of this part, *maṅgalavāda* ("benediction") and *prāmāṇyavāda* ("theory of truth"), were commented upon and elaborated by them.

Part II, the chapter on inference, was the most important and influential. It was also the most profound portion of the whole book. Later Navya-nyāya tradition, which produced series of commentaries and sub-commentaries on this part, divided it into two broad sections: *vyāptikāṇḍa*, the section dealing with the definition of inference and pervasion as a principle underlying inference, and *jñānakaṇḍa*, the section dealing with *pakṣatā* (subjecthood), deduction, classification of fallacies. For about three or four centuries after Gaṅgeśa, Navya-nyāya scholarship in India "flowed through a large number of channels cut by single sentences or phrases of this part of Gaṅgeśa's work and by far the widest channel emerged from the general definition of fallacy."[99]

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[99] See D. C. BHATTACHARYA, 1958, p. 108.

Part III, the chapter on *upamāna*, is the shortest in the book. It has generally been neglected by later scholars. Only two scholars, Pragalbha and Rucidatta, are known to have written commentaries on this part. Part IV deals with verbal testimony, with the problems of grammar, language and meaning. Like part II, part IV has also been very popular. Many Navya-nyāya authors either wrote commentaries on it or produced independent works dealing with the concepts discussed in this part. It goes without saying that the overwhelming popularity of Gaṅgeśa's work on *pramāṇa* pushed the works of the old Nyāya school gradually into the background, if not into oblivion.

Although Gaṅgeśa quoted a verse from Jñānaśrīmitra, the well-known Buddhist philosopher, his main opponents were not the Buddhists but the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas. It is significant that no notable Buddhist philosopher appeared after Mokṣākaragupta (twelfth century A.D.). Udayana, in his Ātmatattvaviveka, called the Prabhākaras "friends of the Buddhists." Thus, from the twelfth century onwards, philosophic activity in India was kept alive through the debates and counter-arguments of the Prabhākaras and the Naiyāyikas.

Gaṅgeśa belonged to Mithilā. His probable date was 1325 A.D. He called his own book a "jewel" *(maṇi)*, and later writers used to refer to him as Maṇikāra ("the jeweller"). In the introductory verses, he said that his book was meant for the decoration of scholars, and opponents who would be refuted in his book would no longer be able to press their views cleverly in debates. This claim proved to be true.

18. Vardhamāna and the Mithilā School

Vardhamāna, a son of Gaṅgeśa, established the tradition and the methodology of his father by writing as many as nine learned commentaries in Navya-nyāya style on different pre-Gaṅgeśa teachers. His commentaries were called by the general name Prakāśa "Elucidation." He wrote on all the important works of Udayana, on Śrīvallabha, Śrīharṣa and Keśavamiśra. He also produced an independent commentary on Chapter V of the Nyāya sūtras. Although he did not write a commentary on his father's book, he very frequently introduced the latter's views in various places. All these excerpts taken together can form an excellent commentary on Gaṅgeśa's book.

In the galaxy of post-Gaṅgeśa writers of Mithilā four stars shone the brightest of all: Śaṅkaramiśra, Vācaspati Miśra II, Yajñapati, and Jayadeva (Pakṣadhara). Śaṅkaramiśra's contribution to the Vaiśeṣika literature has already been discussed. Besides, he wrote the following Navya-nyāya works: 1) Maṇimayūkha; a commentary on the Tattvacintāmaṇi; the circulation of this work was, however, limited. 2) An original treatise called Bhedaprakāśa which was

a bold refutation of Vedāntic monism. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the leading scholar of the Advaita school, wrote his highly polemical Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa to refute this work. 3) Vādivinoda which was a remarkable manual dealing with the rules of debate. It was divided into five chapters. 4) Khaṇḍanaṭīkā, a commentary on Śrīharṣa. This shows that Śaṅkara was not against the Vedāntic monism.

Vācaspati Miśra II was a famous Navya-nyāya author, a contemporary of Śaṅkaramiśra in 1400—1450 A.D. He was a prolific writer. He was also a well-known authority on the Maithila Smṛti literature. His Nyāya works include the following: 1) Tattvāloka, which is a commentary on the Nyāya-sūtras. 2) Nyāya-sūtroddhāra recording the number and the readings of the Nyāya-sūtras. Vācaspati Miśra II recorded 531 Nyāya-sūtras as opposed to 528 arrived at by Vācaspati Miśra I. 3) Nyāyaratnaprakāśa, a commentary on Maṇikaṇṭha. 4) Kkaṇḍanoddhāra, an independent work containing a bold refutation of Śrīharṣa's Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya. This displayed the author's dialectical skill and the vastness of his learning. Unlike the Bhedaprakāśa, it was written in the intricate style of Navya-nyāya.

Vācaspati wrote probably three other independent treatises, Pratyakṣanirṇaya, Anumānanirṇaya, and Śabdanirṇaya. They survived only in citations. In his early days Vācaspati was patronized by Queen Padmāvatī of Pāñcāla. But later on he was employed by the royal family of Mithilā.

Yajñapati wrote his famous Prabhā commentary on the three parts of Gaṅgeśa's work, perception, inference and verbal testimony. This commentary overshadowed all the previous commentaries on this book. Yajñapati's date was 1450 A.D. This was also the beginning of the glorious phase of Navya-nyāya studies in Mithilā and Bengal—a phase which soon reached its unsurpassed heights in subtleties and intricacies of definition and dialectical methodology. Yajñapati's eminence was challenged by many later writers, notably by his own pupil, Jayadeva. Even Pragalbha and Vāsudeva of Bengal followed Jayadeva's line in attacking Yajñapati. But Raghunātha referred many times to Yajñapati's views with approval.

Jayadeva Pakṣadhara was the author of the well-known Āloka ("light") commentary (Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka) on Gaṅgeśa's work. He succeeded in founding a new sub-school *(saṃpradāya)* of Navya-nyāya, followers of the Āloka, which dominated the Navya-nyāya studies throughout India for a long time. He became very popular during his lifetime. Anecdotes regarding his encounters with Vyāsatīrtha of Karṇāṭaka, Southern India, and Raghunātha of Bengal are only indications of his great glory. Vyāsatīrtha's Tarkatāṇḍava was a landmark of the Mādhva contribution to Navya-nyāya literature. This author was thoroughly acquainted with the Mithilā school of Navya-nyāya.

There was another Pakṣadhara who wrote Viveka ("Dissension, Investigation") commentaries on the Tattvacintāmaṇi, the Kiraṇāvalī, and the Nyāyalīlāvatī. For a long time, this Pakṣadhara was thought to be identical with the

author of the Āloka. But D. C. Bhattacharya solved the puzzle by showing that these two Pakṣadharas must be distinguished from each other.[100]

The conflict between Yajñapati and his pupil Jayadeva marked the most glorious period of Mithilā for over a century. With the cessation of this phase the glory of Navya-nyāya in that region practically ended. There were three important Nyāya authors of Mithilā in the post-Jayadeva period. 1) Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura was a direct pupil of Jayadeva. He wrote sub-commentaries on Vardhamāna's works: Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa, Kusumāñjali-prakāśa and Līlāvatī-prakāśa. These sub-commentaries were generally called Prakāśikā. Bhagīratha's nickname was Megha. He was a contemporary of Raghunātha, and his younger brother Maheśa Ṭhakkura later became the King of Darbhaṅga. His date was about 1500 A.D.

2) Maheśa Ṭhakkura was the author of the famous Darpaṇa sub-commentary on the Āloka of Jayadeva. He went to the court of Queen Durgāvatī of Gaḍh-Mandla. He became King of Darbhaṅga in 1556—57 A.D. In his old age he abdicated the throne, but continued to write on Smṛti.

3) Madhusūdana Ṭhakkura wrote another sub-commentary, Kaṇṭakoddhāra, on the Āloka. He tried to answer the adverse criticisms directed against Jayadeva and Gaṅgeśa. He was well-versed in many other Śāstras, including Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Grammar and Dharmaśāstra. He is believed to have controverted the views of Raghunātha of the Bengal school.

Annaṃbhaṭṭa, a very learned Navya-nyāya author from the south (17th century), is well-known for his very concise manual, Tarkasaṃgraha "Compendium of logic and dialectics". This text is very popular with the students who are beginners in Navya-nyāya. Annaṃbhaṭṭa was highly influenced by the Mithilā school. He was a follower of the Āloka of Jayadeva. He also wrote a sub-commentary on the Āloka, called Siddhāñjana, in which he referred to all the Mithilā scholars mentioned above and discussed a considerable number of problems and controversies.

19. The Bengal School of Navya-nyāya

The first important Navya-nyāya author of Bengal was Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma. He was probably a contemporary of Jayadeva. He wrote an elaborate commentary on the Anumāna part of Gaṅgeśa, the Tattvacintāmaṇivyākhyā, which, unlike the Dīdhiti, explained many difficult lines of this predecessor. He respectfully referred to Vardhamāna's views on several occasions, but he was highly critical of Yajñapati. He also wrote a commentary on the Advaita-makaranda, a text on Vedāntic monism.

Although the Bengal school was said to have started with Vāsudeva, there

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[100] D. C. BHATTACHARYA, 1958, p. 116—120.

were several Bengali authors of Navya-nyāya who lived in Benares. Pragalbha was the famous writer of this group, and he preceded Vāsudeva. He was probably a junior contemporary of Yajñapati. He wrote about eight commentaries on such authors as Gaṅgeśa, Vardhamāna, Śrīharṣa and Śrīvallabha.[101] Pragalbha's commentary on the section of God in the Tattvacintāmaṇi was the most elaborate of all. It was almost one-fourth of his entire commentary on the Anumāna part. Vāsudeva refuted Pragalbha's view in many places. Pragalbha was for a long time believed to belong to Mithilā. But D. C. Bhattacharya has conclusively established that he was a Bengali.

After Vāsudeva several Bengali authors wrote commentaries on different sections of the Tattvacintāmaṇi. But it was Raghunātha Śiromaṇi who became the most successful leader of the Bengal school. He was a pupil of Vāsudeva, but like Jayadeva he refuted his teacher's views in many places. He established a sub-school in Bengal which was later on followed by a generation of scholars, who wrote commentaries and sub-commentaries to throw light on Raghunātha's interpretation of the Tattvacintāmaṇi. His commentaries are called by the general name Dīdhiti ("Ray of light"). Besides explaining Gaṅgeśa, he commented also on Udayana and Śrīvallabha.

Raghunātha (ca. 1500 A.D.)[102] refuted Jayadeva's view almost at every step, but showed sympathy and tolerance for Yajñapati's view. His style is most difficult, but it attains the goal of philosophic precision and conciseness. Instead of simply explaining Gaṅgeśa, Raghunātha more often criticized this philosopher and suggested improvements or rephrasings. He wrote three short independent treatises, Nañvāda, Ākhyātavāda and Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa. The last work is very significant, for it criticized and revised the time-honoured categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. In this respect, Raghunātha was the spiritual successor of such authors as Bhāsarvajña.

As an example of Raghunātha's style of philosophical writing, I cite below a passage from his Nañ-vāda:

1. "[Each of the particles referred to by the symbol] '*nañ*' may mean either a relational absence or a mutual absence. (Note: The symbol '*nañ*' stands, in general, for all the negative particles in Sanskrit.)

2. In either case the property of being the counterpositive must be taken to be delimited by the property that also delimits the relational property *anvayitā-to-nañ* (i.e., the intensional property of being syntactically connected to *nañ;* see also below). This rule derives from the conventional manner of interpreting sentences. Thus one does not say, "A pot is not on a place which has a blue pot" or "A blue pot is not a pot," whereas one does say, "A yellow pot is not on this place which has a blue pot" or "A yellow pot is not [a] blue [pot]," etc.

3. The syntactical binding of the counterpositive and that of the absence will be homogeneous in all respects. On this principle, if the binding of the adjunct presented (i.e., denoted) by word *x* to its subjunct is by some superstratum-substatum relation, this will hold also in the case of the relational absence of that

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[101] See D. C. Bhattacharya, 1952, p. 249—259.

[102] See D. C. Bhattacharya, 1952, p. 97—101; Frauwallner, WZKSA 10; 11; 14.

[denotatum of *x*]. For example, in "*Caitraḥ pacati*" and "*Caitro na pacati,*" ["Caitra cooks" and "Caitra does not cook"], just as that which is denoted by the word ending in the nominative case [viz., *Caitraḥ*, *Caitro*] is related to the effort expressed by the personal ending of the verb [the '*ti*' of '*pacati*' in the first sentence], just so will it be related to the absence of that [effort, an absence expressed by '*na*' in the second sentence]. The examples "*Caitrasyedam*" and "*Caitrasya nedam*" ["This is of (i.e., belongs to) Caitra" and "This is not of (i.e., does not belong to) Caitra"] should likewise be homogeneous.

(Transl. by B. K. Matilal)

Tradition relates stories about Raghunātha's journey to Mithilā, his debate with Jayadeva, and his dishonourable victory over the latter. But there is little truth in such stories. They indicate only his popularity. He obtained unbounded fame as a Navya-nyāya author. His books circulated all over India within a short period, and were studied with great care. He obtained the nickname "Kāṇa" because he was blind of one eye. Even the Jaina author Yaśovijayagaṇi showed his appreciation of Raghunātha in his Nyāyakhaṇḍakhādya.

Jānakīnātha Bhaṭṭācārya Cūḍāmaṇi was a junior contemporary of Raghunātha (1520 A.D.).[103] He wrote a short treatise on Navya-nyāya called Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī. Like the Tattvacintāmaṇi it was divided into four parts. Jānakīnātha referred to his own commentary on Gaṅgeśa called Maṇimarīci, but unfortunately it is lost to us. He also wrote another commentary, following Udayana, on Chapter V of the Nyāya-sūtras. Kaṇāda Tarkavāgīśa, a pupil of Jānakīnātha, wrote another commentary on Gaṅgeśa, but it is also lost to us.

Rāmabhadra, Jānakīnātha's son, wrote a commentary on the first four chapters of the Nyāya-sūtras. This book was intended probably to supplement his father's work on the fifth chapter. It was more elaborate than Viśvanātha's Nyāyasūtravṛtti. The latter work, however, became more popular. Rāmabhadra commented also on two independent works of Raghunātha, Padārthakhaṇḍana and Nañvāda, as well as on the verses of Nyāyakusumāñjali.

In the next generation of scholars in Bengal, we find generally interpreters or commentators of Raghunātha. Four authors of this period achieved undying fame: Bhavānanda, Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa, and Gadādhara. But there was another author, Kṛṣṇadāsa, who preceded all these four. His commentaries on Raghunātha have not been fully preserved. He probably wrote also the famous Navya-nyāya manual, Bhāṣāpariccheda. It was generally believed that this manual was written by Viśvanātha. But D. C. Bhattacharya argued, on the evidence of existing manuscripts, that it was from the pen of Kṛṣṇadāsa.[104] Kṛṣṇadāsa was the teacher of Bhavānanda.

Bhavānanda (ca. 1570 A.D.) was the first important commentator on various works of Raghunātha: 1) Pratyakṣa-dīdhiti, 2) Anumāna-dīdhiti, 3) Ākhyātavāda, 4) Nañvāda, 5) Līlāvatī-dīdhiti. He also commented on the Āloka of Jayadeva. He wrote several independent treatises on the problems of grammar and Navya-nyāya. His most popular text is the Kārakacakra, which is studied

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[103] Ibid., p. 106—108.

[104] D. C. Bhattacharya, 1952, p. 117—119.

in most seminaries today. But the Daśalakāravivecana and other small tracts are not so popular.

Guṇānanda was a contemporary of Bhavānanda. He wrote also commentaries on Raghunātha's work, but his independent commentary on the Nyāyakusumāñjali was more successful than his other writings.

Viśvanātha Tarkapañcānana (± 1630) is credited with a manual of logic, called Bhāṣāpariccheda, or Kārikāvali, which as a text-book of the Navadvīpa school was to become a great favourite of students. It consists of 166 memorial stanzas–not all of them of Viśvanātha's making–which were known by heart by thousands of paṇḍits. The author supplied this manual with a commentary, the Siddhāntamuktāvalī. Like Keśavamiśra's Tarkabhāṣā and other works of this type it does not open up new fields of inquiry or criticize other systems; these works confine themselves to describing their own system, defining its notions and stating its doctrines.

Mathurānātha (ca. 1600–ca. 1675) was certainly the most popular and one of the most prolific of the post-Raghunātha Nyāya authors. His fame extended all over India. His original commentary on all the four parts of Gaṅgeśa's work was the most significant contribution to Navya-nyāya literature. Although he followed Raghunātha, his style was much simpler and hence more accessible to scholars. In many places, he disagreed with Raghunātha and Jayadeva. He wrote a sub-commentary on Jayadeva's Āloka, and probably also a sub-commentary on the principal works of Raghunātha. But only a few fragments of these sub-commentaries have so far been discovered. He wrote apparently an original Navya-nyāya manual called Siddhāntarahasya, for he referred to this work more than once in his other writings. But it is yet to be discovered.

A specimen of his style is given below:

After describing the validity of the inferential means, [Gaṅgeśa] begins to describe the nature of pervasion with the words, "but now, etc." By "the cause of an inference" he means the cause of the inference as to the validity of the inferential means. "Knowledge of a pervasion" is in the locative case, for [pervasion] is its content. Thus the meaning is, "What is the pervasion that is the content of that knowledge of pervasion which is the cause of an inference as to the validity of the inferential means?"

By the words, "[the pervasion which is] the cause of the inference as to the validity of the inferential means," we indicate that the pervasion gives rise to the validity of the inferential means. Hence, the connection between the present description of pervasion and the preceding description of the validity of the inferential means is shown to be an *upodghāta* connection. 'Gives rise to' means 'gives rise to the knowledge of.'

But some say that the word 'inference' means the inference to the effect that there resides in inference a difference from what is other [than inference]. In this inference, viz., 'inference is different from what is other [than inference],' the *h* in the form of the [definition of inference] previously given [by Gaṅgeśa, T.C., II, 2], viz., 'a knowledge born of a [former] knowledge of the nature of a *pakṣa*, in which [former knowledge] a pervasion is the chief qualifier.' Now 'pervasion' is a qualifier in the element 'knowledge of a pervasion' and this element goes to

make up [i.e., is a stage necessarily preceding] this *h*. Gaṅgeśa means to say 'What is *this* pervasion?' (Transl. by D. H. H. Ingalls)

Jagadīśa's sub-commentary on Raghunātha's Anumāna-dīdhiti is famous by the name Jāgadīśī. This work became very influential and eclipsed the glory of earlier commentaries on Raghunātha. Jagadīśa wrote also an original commentary on Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi (probably on all four parts) called Mayūkha. But he was unable to beat the glory of Mathurānātha's commentary in this regard. Thus, while Mathurānātha is famous for his Rahasya commentary on Gaṅgeśa, Jagadīśa is famous for his Jāgadīśī on Raghunātha.

Jagadīśa wrote several original texts on Navya-nyāya. But he was most successful with his Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā. This text became a great favourite of Nyāya scholars and was almost substituted for the Śabda part of Gaṅgeśa in the seminaries. Jagadīśa wrote also the Sūkti commentary on Praśastapāda, and another sub-commentary on Raghunātha's Līlāvatī-dīdhiti. He prepared a brief manual on Navya-nyāya, called Tarkāmṛta, which was probably the simplest of all available Navya-nyāya manuals. He also composed another independent short work called Nyāyādarśa. According to D. C. Bhattacharya, Jagadīśa lived circa 1600 A.D., and during his lifetime he obtained the glorious title of Jagadguru ("the teacher of the world").[105]

Gadādhara wrote the most elaborate and profound, and perhaps the most original, commentary on Raghunātha's Anumāna-dīdhiti. He was also the last important landmark in the history of Navya-nyāya literature. His commentary is known by the name Gādādharī. He gained country-wide fame by this work. Like Jagadīśa he also composed a commentary on Gaṅgeśa, but it did not become very popular. Some fragments of his commentary on Āloka are also available. He commented on the two other books of Raghunātha, Nañvāda and Ātmatattvaviveka-dīdhiti. There are many original short tracts written apparently by Gadādhara. These tracts were collected together under the name Vādavāridhi. Two books of Gadādhara, Muktivāda and Śaktivāda, became favourites of later scholars. Gadādhara's teacher was Harirāma, who wrote also a number of small tracts on Navya-nyāya. Several treatises of Harirāma have recently been edited and published with the commentaries of modern scholars such as Ananta Kumar Tarkatīrtha and Taranath Tarkatīrtha. D. C. Bhattacharya ascertained that the life-span of Gadādhara should fall between 1604 and 1709 A.D.[106]

D. C. Bhattacharya has mentioned several Navya-nyāya authors in the post-Gadādhara period, which extends up to the middle of the nineteenth century. During this period, however, creative writing was concentrated mainly on exhibiting dialectical skill on some crucial, technical points of Navya-nyāya philosophy. This class of writings is described as Patrikā ("Leaf for writing upon, Letter"). Golokanātha (1807–1855 A.D.) was famous for his most

[105] Ibid., p. 171.
[106] Ibid., p. 182–183.

elaborate Patrikā on various sections of the Gādādharī. Another important author of this time was Jagannātha of Trivenī (1700—1807 A.D.).[107] He was the author of several Patrikās in Navya-nyāya. Let me conclude with a remark of William Jones about Jagannātha's versatility. When William Jones translated the Śakuntalā into English in 1789 A.D. he wrote in the Preface: "The venerable compiler of the Hindu digest (Jagannātha), who is now in the eighty-sixth year, has the whole play of Śacontalā by heart as he proved when I last conversed with him to my entire satisfaction."

The history of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, thus, forms a very important component of the cultural history of India. This tradition, along with a few others, shows clearly that Indian philosophical literature did not always deal exclusively with idealism, monism, subjectivism and mysticism. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers were, instead, critical and positive thinkers, and genuinely interested in logic, analysis of human knowledge and language, and descriptive metaphysics. Existence of these thoughts in classical and medieval India proved to be a proper "antidote" to the prevalent world-negating attitude of some forms of Vedānta and Buddhism. One can go even further and say that the massive literature, the history of which I have only very briefly described here, constitutes an important and interesting chapter in the history of philosophy and human thought.

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[107] Ibid., p. 227—228.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Ind. Philos.	= Indian Philosophy
Journ.	= Journal
Nyāya philos.	= Nyāya Philosophy
Pratimā	= Pratimānāṭaka
Pre-Dignāga Texts	= Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources.
T.C.	= Tattvacintāmaṇi
Transl.	= Translation
V.S.	= Vaiśeṣika-sūtras
WZKSA	= Wiener Zs. f. die Kunde Süd-Asiens

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